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SHRINKING DOMAIN OF INVIDIOUS INTENT*
K.G. Jan Pillai'"
The landmark case of Washington v. Davis made invidious intent the
touchstone of violation of the Equal Protection Clause. In this Article, Professor
K G. Jan Pillai discusses the current state of the doctrine of invidious intent and its
evolving role in Supreme Court jurisprudence. In the area of criminal law
enforcement, strict application ofthe doctrine often produces harsh results. Among
the existing three-tiered scrutiny standards, the doctrine appears out ofplace. In
recent racial gerrymandering cases, the Supreme Court substantively modified the
meaning of the doctrine. Despite the apparent instability of the doctrine, Professor
Pillai concludes the solution lies in making the intent doctrine compatible with the
neutrality doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Davis,' the touchstone of
violation of the Equal Protection Clause is "invidious discriminatory purpose"2 or
intent' ("the Davis rule"). In Davis, the Court upheld a facially neutral law that
produced a racially disproportionate impact on minorities,' by invoking "the basic
equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially
discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose."5
Although the Court did not define the term precisely, it was clear from the cases it
cited as supportive precedents6 that invidious intent in Davis meant that the
' 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
2 Id. at 242.
' The Court consistently used "purpose" and "intent" interchangeably. The Court in
Davis stated: "The differentiating factor between dejure segregation and so-called defacto
segregation ... ispurpose or intent to segregate." Id. at 240 (quoting Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No.
1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973)). The Court, in its next decision on the subject, stated: "Proof
of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause." Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977).
4 Davis involved the constitutionality of a written examination administered to
applicants for positions as officers in the District of Columbia Police Department; the test
had a racially disproportionate impact on African-American applicants. See 426 U.S. at 237.
The black applicants who failed urged the Court to apply the Title VII disparate impact
standard the Court adopted in Griggs v. DukePower Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), which would
have required the government to show that the examination was job related and justified by
business necessity. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 236. The Court rejected the disparate impact
standard applicable to Title VII stating: "We have never held that the constitutional standard
for adjudicating claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to the standards
applicable under Title VII, and we decline to do so today." Id. at 239.
' Davis, 426 U.S. at 240.
6 The Court cited Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (school segregation);
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (racially disproportionate impact of the
provisions of the Social Security Act); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964) (racial
gerrymandering); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (invidiously discriminatory
application of a facially neutral law); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)
(exclusion of blacks from grand and petit juries in criminal proceedings).
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decisionmaker had to have a subjective motivation to disadvantage or inflict harm
on racial minorities."
In one of the two subsequent cases, Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp.,' not only did the Court reaffirm the Davis rule as the
"comprehensive account of discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause,"9 but
it also provided a checklist of factors that might tend to establish invidious
discriminatory intent. In Arlington Heights, the Court rejected a disproportionate
racial impact claim that the village's zoning policy prevented construction of low-
cost housing because of the challengers' failure to prove "that discriminatory
purpose was a motivating factor in the Village's decision."'0 Nevertheless, the
Court spelled out some evidentiary aspects of the Davis rule-it "does not require
a plaintiff to prove that the challenged action rested solely on racially
discriminatory purposes."" Invariably, "a sensitive inquiry" into all available,
direct and circumstantial evidence may be necessary to "determin[e] whether
invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor."' 2 The Court also
enumerated a number of factors, including legislative history, sequence of events,
patterns of behavior, and departures from normal decisionmaking procedures, 3 as
appropriate evidentiary sources to divine invidious intent.
The Davis rule was further refined in PersonnelAdministrator ofMassachusetts
v. Feeney.' At issue in the case was the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute
that gave an absolute preference to veterans in civil servicejobs. Since over ninety-
eight percent of the state's veterans were men,5 the statute operated
overwhelmingly to the disadvantage of women. The plaintiff, a female employee
adversely affected by the preference system, claimed that the law was "inherently
' See Pamela S. Karlan, Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured
Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE L.J. 111, 112 (1983). Justice Stevens, in his
concurring opinion, argued that the "most probative evidence of intent will be objective
evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence describing the subjective state of
mind of the actor. For normally the actor is presumed to have intended the natural
consequence of his deeds." Davis, 426 U.S. at 253. He also suggested that "the line between
discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is not nearly as bright ... as the reader of
the Court's opinion might assume." Id. at 254.
8 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
9 David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
935, 998 (1989); see also Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265.
'0 429 U.S. at 270 (emphasis added).
Id at 265.
12 Id. at 266.
See id at 266-68.
14 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
'" See id. at 270. When the legislation commenced, only 1.8% of the veterans in
Massachusetts were female. See id. Over one-quarter of the state's population were veterans.
See id
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nonneutral"' 6 and that it discriminated against women in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. Conceding that the legislative goal was to benefit veterans, both
male and female, she argued that the legislature should have been aware that the
means chosen to achieve the goal inevitably would "freeze women out of all those
state jobs actively sought by men."' 7 Her argument rested on the common law
assumption "that a person intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of his
voluntary actions." 8
The Supreme Court agreed that it would be "disingenuous to say that the
adverse consequences of [the] legislation for women were unintended, in the sense
that they were not volitional or in the sense that they were not foreseeable."' 9 It also
recognized the severity of the law's disproportionate impact on women. But, the
Court insisted that there could be no equal protection violation without proof of
invidious discrimination or "discriminatory purpose," as required by the Davis and
Arlington Heights cases. The Court explained that discriminatory purpose "implies
more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences."2 Rather, it
implies that the "state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of
action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon
an identifiable group."'" Because the plaintiff in the case failed to prove that the
legislature enacted the veterans preference law because of its adverse effect on
women, the Court ruled that the law reflected no "invidious gender-based
discrimination."2
Feeney significantly clarified the Davis rule. First, the showing required to
prove invidious intent in a disparate impact case is not how severe the impact is, but
rather that the legislature enacted the law because of its adverse impact on the
disadvantaged group. The Court pointedly noted the statement of the district court
that in enacting the veterans preference law, "[t]o be sure, the legislature did not
wish to harm women."' Second, once the invidious intent is established as a
motivating factor, the magnitude or intensity of the resulting discrimination would
16 id. at 277.
17 'Id. at 278 (quoting the district court's concurring opinion, 451 F. Supp. 143, 151
(1978)).
Is Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 279.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 274. The Court stated that when a facially gender-neutral statute is challenged
on the ground of disproportionate impact, it will engage in a two-fold inquiry: first, whether
the statute is indeed gender-neutral, and second, "whether the adverse effect reflects
invidious gender-based discrimination." Id
23 Id. at 278 (quoting the district court's concurring opinion, 451 F. Supp. 143, 151).
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not be relevant.24 "Discriminatory intent," the Court said, "is simply not amenable
to calibration. It either is a factor that has influenced the legislative choice or it is
not."' Finally, the Court will entirely forgo the inquiry into invidious intent if the
challenged law is premised on facially explicit race or gender classifications. Such
classifications "in themselves supply a reason to infer antipathy,"'26 and therefore,
are presumptively invalid "regardless of [their] purported motivation"27 unless
justified by "extraordinary"28 or "exceedingly persuasive" governmental interests.29
The Davis rule is now firmly embedded in equal protection jurisprudence. The
entire expanse of rules governing the doctrine of invidious intent are expounded in
the Davis trilogy. The Court has never attempted to authenticate the invidious
intent doctrine by reference to the text or legislative history of the Equal Protection
Clause. Indeed, to pave its way for the adoption of the doctrine, the Court in Davis
had to abandon some of its important precedents and disagree with sixteen lower
court decisions that "impressively demonstrate[d] that there [was] another side to
the issue [of invidious intent]."3" The Davis Court adopted the doctrine of invidious
intent solely on the premise that a contrary rule "would be far reaching and would
raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare,
public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to
the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent white."'" In subsequent
cases, the "Court has treated a simple citation to, or quotation from, [the Davis
trilogy] as sufficient tojustify requiring plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent in
order to show a denial of equal protection."
24 See id. at 277 ("Invidious discrimination does not become less so because the
discrimination accomplished is of a lesser magnitude.").
25 Id.
26 Id at 272.
27 Id.
28 Id Racial classification will be upheld only "upon an extraordinary justification." Id
In later cases, the Court extended strict scrutiny to racial classification, which would require
the government to demonstrate that the classification is narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling interest. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
29 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 273. Gender classification must bear a substantial relationship to
important governmental objectives. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
30 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,245 (1976). The Court disagreed with decisions
of six courts of appeals and several district courts which generally held that disproportionate
impact alone, without regard to discriminatory purpose, would suffice to violate the Equal
Protection Clause. See id at 244-45. The Court also disregarded its decisions in Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (warning against grounding decisions on legislative purpose
or motivation) and Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972) (holding that
racial impact of a law, rather than its discriminatory purpose, was the critical factor). See id
at 244.
31 Davis, 426 U.S. at 248.
32 Todd Rakoff, Washington v. Davis and the Objective Theory of Contracts, 29 HARV.
2001]
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It may be argued plausibly that the Davis rule reflects the venerable common
law tradition of not subjecting a party to liability without establishing causation and
culpability, and, therefore, requires no independentjustification. Even though it is
a substantive limitation on the right to equal protection, the Davis rule operates as
an evidentiary requirement not much different from analogous rules of criminal law
or tort litigation. If the Davis rule was applied strictly and consistently to all equal
protection challenges to legislative and executive decisions, it could find even a
constitutional foundation in the doctrine of separation of powers. Currently, the
challengers' burden of proof under the Davis rule is so insurmountable that in most
cases they cannot establish invidious intent.33 It is almost impossible to detect, sort
out, and quantify the motives of individual legislators who vote for legislation on
the basis of their own disparate beliefs, values, interests, and circumstances. It is
inaccurate to suggest that there is an ascertainable, unequivocal motivation of the
legislature; invariably, legislators are motivated by different reasons even while
voting for the same law. Therefore, one who searches for the invidious
discriminatory intent of a legislature may well end up "trying to prove something
that may be non-existent."34 To the extent it insulates legislative decisions from
judicial scrutiny, the rule of "invidious intent facilitates the Court's recognition of
the importance of separation of powers."35
This Article is not concerned with either the rationale or the constitutional
groundings of the Davis rule of invidious intent. It seeks to discern the current state
of the doctrine of invidious intent and its role in the prevailing equal protection
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. Following a brief description of the
substantive elements of the doctrine, this Article, in Part II, examines the doctrine's
harsh effect on claims of equal protection violations in criminal law enforcement.
Part III assesses the relevance of the doctrine of invidious intent to equal protection
cases under the existing three-tiered scrutiny standards and finds that the doctrine
is mostly inconsequential. Part IV describes the substantive overhaul of the
doctrine that the Supreme Court found necessary to make the doctrine operational
to recent racial gerrymandering cases. Part V demonstrates that, at least in some
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63, 65 (1994).
" See generally Gayle Binion, "Intent" and Equal Protection: A Reconsideration, 1983
Sup. CT. REV. 397 (1983); Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of
Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 295 (1988); Randall L.
Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101
HARv. L. REV. 1388, 1402 (1988) (observing that "no defendant in state or federal court has
ever successfully challenged his punishment on grounds of racial discrimination in
sentencing").
34 L. H. LaRue, Discriminatory Intent, I RACE & ETHNic ANC. L. J. 17, 20 (1995).
31 Jeffery A. Kruse, Note, Substantive Equal Protection Analysis Under State v. Russell,
and the Potential Impact on the Criminal Justice System, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 179 1,
1801 (1993).
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instances, the courts may have no choice but to discard the invidious intent doctrine
in order to enforce the mandate of the Equal Protection Clause. Finally, this Article
reaches the unavoidable conclusion that the invidious intent doctrine is hopelessly
adrift, having no certainty in meaning or consistency in application. Since it has
proven to be a theoretical oddity, hindering principled constitutional adjudication,
and has become increasingly redundant in the emerging, neutrality-driven equal
protection jurisprudence, this Article suggests that either the doctrine may be
phased out or the exact areas of its operation be clearly demarcated.
I. DISSECrING THE DA VIS RULE
A. The Intent or Motivation
The core of the Davis rule is "invidious intent." Since the Supreme Court
decisions in the Davis trilogy, the Justices have used the term "invidious intent" in
eighteen cases.36 It has been the Court's tradition to express the concept of
invidious intent in multiple interchangeable terms37 such as "discriminatory
intent,"38 "invidious discrimination," '39 and "purposeful discrimination,"4° at times
using more than one or a combination of these terms in the same case.4 The federal
36 See e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,677 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Hemandez
v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 375 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 665 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (interpreting Title VII disparate
treatment); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 352 n.5 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 172 n. 10 (1986) (plurality opinion of Justice White, the
author of Davis); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986); id. at 332 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 584 (1983) (using the
term "discriminatory intent"); id at 645 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (using the term "invidious
intent"); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 642 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Connecticut
v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982) (using the terms "racial purpose" and "invidious intent"
in a Title VII case); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449,472 (1979) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
31 See, e.g., Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944) ("Purposeful discrimination,");
id. at 7 ("intentional or purposeful discrimination,"); id. at I I ("invidious and purposely
discriminatory"); Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404,438 (1935) ("invidious discrimination");
Bindini Petroleum v. Super. Ct., 284 U.S. 8, 19 (1931) ("invidious discrimination"); Barbier
v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 30 (1884) ("invidious discrimination").
38 See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 116 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,
1001 (1996); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,468 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 500
U.S. 900, 924 (1995).
'9 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 529 (2000); Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S.
526, 550 (1999).
40 Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 369 n.15 (2000).
4 1 Bossier Parish, 528 U.S. at 343 ("discriminatory intent"); id. at 369 n.15 ("purposeful
discrimination"); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 115 n.7, 137, 141 (1996) ("invidious
2001]
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courts of appeals, as well, have been lavish in using various "invidious intent" terms
in equal protection cases."
Irrespective of the variations in the terminology used by the courts, "intent" and
"invidiousness" have always been understood as the indispensable components of
the Davis rule. Both intent and invidiousness are necessary to commit a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court has not defined clearly the
meaning of invidiousness; the meaning seems to fluctuate from issue to issue or
simply "has changed over time."'43 But, the Court initially left little room for
confusion about the scope and meaning of intent. In Feeney, the Court asserted that
intent implies more than volition or awareness; it implies that the impugned action
was taken not merely "in spite of" but "at least in part 'because of'" its anticipated
adverse effect on the disadvantaged individual or group." However, during its
quarter-century of evolution, the intent requirement of the Davis rule has changed
fundamentally.
First, the Supreme Court has inextricably linked intent with effect. As
explained in more detail in Part III, in McCleskey v. Kemp,45 where a capital
sentencing practice was challenged on racial grounds, the Court required the
challenger prove not only "the existence of purposeful discrimination,"46 but also
"that the purposeful discrimination 'had a discriminatory effect' on him."
47
discrimination"); id at 136 ("purposeful discrimination"); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127,
137 (1994) ("invidious discrimination"); id. at 155 ("purposeful discrimination"); Alexander
v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 n.12 (1985) ("invidious discrimination"); id. at 292, 294
("purposeful discrimination"); id at 293 ("intentional discrimination"); Snowden, 321 U.S.
1, 7 ("intentional or purposeful discrimination"); id at II ("invidious and purposeful
discriminatory").
42 See e.g., Preferred Physicians Mut. Risk Retention Group v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 913, 918
(2d Cir. 1996) ("discriminatory intent"); United States v. Casper, 956 F.2d 416,419 (3d Cir.
1992) ("discriminatory intent" and "invidious intent"); Riddick v. Sch. Bd. of City of
Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521, 528, 538 (4th Cir. 1986) ("discriminatory intent" and "invidious
intent"); see also Carlton v. Mystic Transp. Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 2000)
("invidious intent to discriminate"); Robin v. Espo Eng'g Corp., 200 F.3d 1081, 1089 (7th
Cir. 2000) ("invidious intent"); Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, 166 F.3d 1332, 1354 (1 1th
Cir. 1999) ("invidious intent" and "invidiously discriminatory animus").
41 Mark Strasser, The Invidiousness of Invidiousness: On the Supreme Court's
Affirmative Action Jurisprudence, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 323, 324 (1994); see infra
section II.
44 442 U.S. at 279 (emphasis added).
45 481 U.S. 279 (1979).
46 Id at 292 (quoting Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967)).
" Id (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)). The Court cited the
Davis and Arlington Heights cases to support the requirement of discriminatory purpose. Id.
at 293-94. The discriminatory effect requirement, described as a "corollary to" the
discriminatory purpose principle, came from Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608
(1985). Id. at 292.
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Moreover, in United States v. Armstrong,48 the defendant who alleged racially
motivated selective prosecution was required to show not only discriminatory intent
and discriminatory effect but also that similarly situated persons of a different race
had not been prosecuted.49 By tying it to discriminatory effect and other
appendages, the Court has deprived invidious intent of its independent
constitutional significance. Recall that the impetus for the Davis rule was to
formulate a standard to identify the unfair and unjustifiable disproportionate effect
of governmental action that the Equal Protection Clause ought not to condone.
Under the Davis trilogy, disproportionate effect-not necessarily discriminatory
effect-was only one among several in the checklist of factors that might tend to
demonstrate invidious intent50  Demonstration of disproportionate impact,
supported by proof of invidious intent, would have been sufficient to prohibit a
governmental action or policy based on the Davis rule. According to the Court's
changed formula, an equal protection plaintiff is saddled with the burden of
showing that an invidiously motivated action or policy is not only
disproportionately burdensome, but discriminatory as well.5'
The second change to the intent prong of the Davis rule occurred when the
Court made a distinction between simple racial motivation and predominant racial
motivation in recent redistricting cases. As race traditionally has been among the
unavoidable mix of factors that a legislature considers in making redistricting
decisions, the Supreme Court found the Davis rule that barred action motivated at
least in part to produce an adverse effect was inappropriate to achieve the goal of
48 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
49 See generally Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective
Prosecution: Enforcing Protection After United States v. Armstrong, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
1071 (1997). The defendant in Armstrong was only seeking an order of discovery from a
U.S. district court. See 517 U.S. at 456.
0 See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275 ("Just as there are cases in which impact alone can
unmask an invidious classification there are others, in which-notwithstanding impact-the
legitimate noninvidious purpose of a law cannot be missed. This is one.") (citations
omitted); Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 255, 266 (1977)
("Detennining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands
a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.
The impact of the official action-whether it 'bears more heavily on one race than another'
may provide an important starting point.") (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242
,(1976)).
"' In Title VII disparate treatment or intentional discrimination cases, the Court has
established a framework for the allocation of burdens and presentation of proof by the
parties to prove purposeful employment discrimination. See St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). In equal protection cases, the plaintiff is not aided by such an
orderly framework. That makes the plaintiff's burden to establish invidious intent much
more difficult than in Title VII cases, and the imposition of any additional burden
unjustifiable.
2001]
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outlawing racial gerrymandering. Therefore, the Court, in a series of redistricting
cases,5 2 held that redistricting constitutes unconstitutional racial gerrymandering
only when race is "the predominant factor motivating the legislature's [redistricting]
decision." 3 The Court had no difficulty in recognizing that redistricting laws,
though generally facially race-neutral, involve mixed motives, and that the only
feasible way to examine their constitutionality is to subject them to strict scrutiny
upon proof of racial motivation.' Such proof is ordinarily obvious on the face of
laws creating majority-minority districts. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that strict
scrutiny does not "apply to all cases of intentional creation of majority-minority
districts,"" absent a showing that race was the predominant factor in their creation.
B. Invidiousness
Traditionally, the invidiousness of a law or governmental action has been a
necessary, if not dispositive, condition for an equal protection violation. The
premise of the condition is that most laws involve classifications creating varying
degrees of inequalities, but not all inequalities trigger equal protection concerns.
As the Supreme Court stated, "[t]he Constitution does not require things which are
different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same,"56 and
"not every denial of a right conferred by state law involves a denial of the equal
protection of the laws, even though the denial of the right to one person may operate
to confer it on another."" Such statutory discriminations will be presumed rational
unless they are shown to be "invidious and purposely discriminatory."" States may
make rational distinctions in regulating their economies under their police powers
"with substantially less than mathematical exactitude . . . [and] it is only the
invidious discrimination, the wholly arbitrary act, which cannot stand consistently
with the Fourteenth Amendment." 9
Despite its constant invocation of "invidiousness" as the sure marker of equal
protection violations, the Supreme Court has left the term undefined for decades.
The Court's failure to articulate a definition of invidiousness may be attributed
either to its inability to encapsulate the contextual adjustments'needed to make the
term operational in myriad situations, or simply to its belief that the term is self-
" See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 91 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959
(1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 905 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916
(1995); see also discussion infra Part V.
" Miller, 515 U.S. at916.
14 Bush, 517 U.S. at 959.
" Id at 958.
56 Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141,147 (1940).
" Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944).
Id. at 11.
s New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976).
[Vol. 9:3
SHRINKING DOMAIN OF INVIDIOUS INTENT
defining. Even without the benefit of a comprehensive definition, the Court has
managed to express the meaning of invidiousness in certain contexts through
undeviating consistency in application. Racial discrimination is one such context.
One of the earliest Supreme Court decisions that expressed the meaning of
invidiousness in memorable language is Yick Wo v. Hopkins.' The case involved
a challenge to the discriminatory administration of certain San Francisco city
ordinances which regulated the operation of laundries in wooden buildings. The
city authorities denied the applications of over two hundred Chinese applicants to
engage in the laundry business, while granting similar applications by eighty non-
Chinese applicants. The Court, finding no reason for the disparate treatment of
Chinese applicants "except hostility to [their] race and nationality,"' held that a
law, if "applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an
unequal hand, so as to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in
similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still
within the prohibition of the Constitution. 62 The Court distinguished two prior
cases in which the same ordinances were upheld, by stating that the cases involved
"no invidious discrimination against anyone." 4
Yick Wo's meaning of invidious racial discrimination was reiterated with greater
clarity when the Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma" struck down a statute that provided
for the sterilization of habitual criminals for eugenic reasons. While the statute
treated grand larceny and embezzlement similarly in every other respect, it only
subjected larcenists to sterilization. The Court maintained that even if the statute's
purpose of preventing the birth of socially undesirable children to habitual criminal
offenders was permissible, the distinction drawn between intrinsically similar
crimes was untenable." The Court recognized that the incidence of the penalty of
sterilization would fall much more heavily on poor people.67 Thus, echoing its
60 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
61 Id at 374.
62 Id. at 373-74.
63 Barbier v. Connolley, 113 U.S. 27 (1885); Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703
(1885).
64 Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 367 (emphasis added).
65 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
66 Id. at 538-39.
67 A person who enters a chicken coop and steals chickens commits a
felony; and he may be sterilized if he is thrice convicted. If, however,
he is a bailee of the property and fraudulently appropriates it, he is an
embezzler. Hence, no matter how habitual his proclivities for
embezzlement are and no matter how often his conviction, he may not
be sterilized.
Id at 539; see also Deborah Hellman, Two Types of Discrimination: The Familiar and the
Forgotten, 86 CAL. L. REV. 315, 346 (1998) ("[W]hile a eugenic purpose... may be
permissible, the goal of eradicating only poor criminals is not.").
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statement in Yick Wo, the Court held that "[w]hen the law lays an unequal hand on
those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilizes
one and not the other, it has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had selected
a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment."'68
The meaning of invidiousness in racial discrimination is derived from the
original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Loving v. Virginia,69 the
Supreme Court declared that "[t]he clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial
discrimination in the States."70 Thus, the Court struck down Virginia's anti-
miscegenation law holding that "[t]here [was] patently no legitimate overriding
purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies [the]
classification"7' and that the laws, by prohibiting only interracial marriages
involving white persons, demonstrated that it was "designed to maintain White
Supremacy." '72
Literally, the word "invidious" conveys the ideas of animosity, resentment, ill-
will, or hostility." When it is used in conjunction with racial discrimination,
"invidious" means oppressive, demeaning, and morally reprehensible, tending to
disadvantage, or inflict harm on, individuals solely because they belong to a
disfavored racial group.74 Without invidiousness, even intentional racial
classifications may not offend the Equal Protection Clause. For instance, in United
Jewish Organizations v. Carey,75 the Supreme Court ruled that a state redistricting
legislation that "deliberately used race in a purposeful manner" was not violative
of the Fourteenth Amendment because it "represented no racial slur or stigma with
respect to whites or any other race."' The Court's past decisions that approved
68 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
69 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
70 Id at 10.
71 Id. at 11.
72 Id. The Court added that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of
choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discrimination." Id at 12.
" "Invidious-tending to rouse ill will, animosity, or resentment; offensive." AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 675 (2d. College ed. (1982)).
71 See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("Invidious discrimination is an engine of oppression, subjugating a disfavored group to
enhance or maintain the power of the majority."); see also Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495,
528, 543 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing invidious discrimination in action
against eligibility requirement for voting for trustees for Office of Hawaiian affairs).
7 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
76 Id. at 165. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion underscored the significance of
invidiousness, thus: "If we were presented here with a classification of voters motivated by
racial animus or with a classification that effectively downgraded minority participation in
the franchise, we promptly would characterize the resort to race as 'suspect' and prohibit its
use." Id at 169-70 (citations omitted); see also, Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 622 (1982)
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explicit racial classification in affirmative action programs also rested on the
rationale of non-invidiousness."
The Court has come closest to clarifying its understanding of invidious intent
in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic," a case brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3) against anti-abortionists who demonstrated at abortion clinics in the
Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. Section 1985(3) provides a cause of action for
damages against persons who conspire "for the purpose of depriving... [a] person
or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws." 9 The Court has long
required a Section 1985(3) plaintiff to show "that [] some racial, or perhaps
otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus [lay] behind the
conspirators' action."' The Court in Bray equated the invidiously discriminatory
animus requirement of the statute with the equal protection requirement of invidious
intent ' and asserted that the Section 1985(3) plaintiff should prove that the
defendants, in this case, persons seeking to prevent abortion in the clinic, had taken
their action "at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of its adverse effects
upon an identifiable group." The Court stressed that invidious discriminatory
animus or intent implies more than awareness of, or indifference to, the effect of the
defendants' actions toward women, rather, it must be shown that they acted with
"hatred of, or condescension toward" women specifically to deprive them of their
right to have an abortion.3
II. THE DRACONIAN APPLICATION
The areas and situations in which the doctrine of invidious intent becomes alive
and operational are too numerous and varied to yield any single conclusion about
(invalidating an at-large scheme of elections, on the ground that the scheme "although
racially neutral when adopted, is being maintained for invidious purposes") (citation
omitted); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217,225 (1971) (explaining that racially motivated
legislation violates the Equal Protection Clause only when the challenged legislation
"affect[s] blacks differently from whites").
' See e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547 (1990); Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448 (1980).
78 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
79 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994). The section was originally enacted as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, § 2, for the purpose of enforcing the Civil War
Amendments.
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
SI The Court cited two equal protection cases that discussed invidiously discriminatory
intent or purpose (Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) and Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484(1974)) and stated that "[t]he same principle applies to the 'class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus' requirement of § 1985(3)." Bray, 506 U.S. at 272.
82 Bray, 506 U.S. at 272 (quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279).
3 Id. at 270.
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the doctrine's precise impact on the equality interests protected by the Constitution.
Without question, the mere existence of the doctrine has had the effect of
discouraging victims of racial discrimination from resorting to the judiciary for
vindication of their grievances.84 Because of this chilling effect, Davis is now
claimed to "rank[] as the most important equal protection case of the last quarter-
century."85 This unenviable status of the invidious intent doctrine of Davis derives
primarily from its harsh application in undiluted form in certain areas, as illustrated
below by its application to criminal law enforcement.
A. Peremptories: Batson v. Kentucky
The Supreme Court remains firmly committed to the invidious intent standard
for adjudicating claims of racial and gender discrimination in the criminal justice
system. The intent doctrine is applied unconditionally to race and gender-based
peremptories and to racially discriminatory prosecuting and sentencing practices.
Keeping with its original design, invidious intent in the context of abuses in the
judicial process focuses on the subjective motivation of errant attomeys-a state of
mind that is recognized as difficult to prove. The evidentiary requirements to
establish the subjective state of mind of prosecutors are so demanding that their
racially prejudicial prosecuting and sentencing decisions are practically impervious
to constitutional challenge by aggrieved criminal defendants. Once recognizing that
the "crippling burden of proof' placed on defendants has made prosecutors'
peremptory challenges "largely immune from constitutional scrutiny, '.6 the Court
in Batson v. Kentucky 7 established a framework for the allocation of burdens and
" Theodore Eisenberg & Sherri Lynn Johnson, The Effect of Intent: Do We Know How
Legal Standards Work?, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1151, 1153 (1991) (showing that a statistical
study found that the Davis rule of invidious intent really discourages victims of racial
discrimination from seeking judicial relief).
8 Ian F. Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of
Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1832 (2000).
86 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92-93 (1986). The Court specifically overruled its
prior decision in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), which required a criminal
defendant to produce "proof of systematic exclusion of African Americans through the use
of peremptories over a period of time" to establish denial of equal protection. Georgia v.
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 47 (1982) (discussing Swain). In Swain, the Court rejected the
defendant's attempt to establish an equal protection claim premised solely on the pattern of
jury strikes in his own case. See id.
87 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In Batson, a state prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to
remove all African Americans from the jury venire to achieve a small white jury to try an
African American indicted on charges of second degree burglary and the receipt of stolen
goods. See id, at 82-83. The defendant moved to prevent impaneling the jury on the ground
that the prosecutor's peremptories violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause and
the Sixth Amendment (the right to have a jury chosen from a cross-section of the
[Vol. 9:3
SHRINKING DOMAIN OF INVIDIOUS INTENT
presentation of proof by opposing parties in peremptory challenges.
Batson set forth a three-step procedure for assessing the constitutionality of
peremptory challenges. First, the opponent of the peremptory challenge has to
make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.88 Then, the burden shifts
to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation.89
Finally, the trial court must decide whether the opponent of the strike has
established "purposeful discrimination." The Court made it clear that the trial
court's finding of intentional discrimination at the third step is a finding of fact and
"largely will turn on evaluation of credibility,"' presumably of the neutral
explanation of the proponent of the strike.
The constitutional injury the Batson Court attempted to redress was threefold.
First, purposeful racial discrimination in selection of jurors violates a criminal
defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial and "to an impartial jury that can view
him without racial animus."' Discriminatory selection ofjurors directly harms "the
accused whose life or liberty they are summoned to try." The Court has even
applied the Batson framework to prohibit a prosecutor's discriminatory exercise of
peremptories to exclude African American jurors in the trial of a white criminal
defendant.94 Second, race-based peremptories deny "the excluded venire-person the
honor and privilege of participating in our system ofj ustice,"95 and thereby "offends
[his or her] dignity."'  The Court, recognizing the equal protection rights of
individuals not to be excluded fromjuries on the basis of race, accorded third-party
community). See id. at 83. The trial court rejected his claim and subsequently convicted him
on both counts. See id. at 83. He sought certiorari from the Supreme Court after having
exhausted his appeals in the state courts. See id. at 84.
" See id. at 93-94. The opponent ofthe peremptory challenge may establish a prima facie
case either by proof of systematic exclusion of members of his race from the venire or "in
other ways," such as showing that the opponent's race is "substantially underrepresented on
the venire from which his jury was drawn, and that the venire was selected under a practice
providing for 'the opportunity for discrimination."' Id. at 95 (quoting Whitus v. Georgia,
385 U.S. 545, 552 (1967)).
89 See id. at 97. The proponent's explanation "need not rise to the level ofjustifying the
exercise of a challenge for cause." Id. However, the proponent cannot rebut "the prima facie
case by stating merely that [the] challenged jurors of the [opponent's] race," as members of
the racial group, are assumed to be inherently biased or unqualified. Id. Nor may the
proponent rebut the opponent's case "merely by denying that he had a discriminatory motive
or 'affirm[ing] [his] good faith in making individual selections."' Id. at 98 (quoting
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)).
9 Id
91 Id at98n.21.
" Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 58 (1992).
'3 Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
'4 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
9 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991).
9 Id. at 628 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991)).
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standing to criminal defendants97 and civil litigants98 to assert the rights of excluded
jurors' rights, reasoning that the "barriers to a suit by an excluded juror are
daunting."" Finally, racially discriminatory exclusion of individuals from juries
"casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process"'" and "undermine[s] public
confidence in the fairness of our system of justice."''
In order to devise the Batson framework, the Court had to tread on the historical
privilege of prosecutors to exercise peremptory challenges "without a reason stated,
without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control."' 2 There was
serious disagreement among the Justices on the desirability of doing so. Then
Justice Rehnquist argued in his dissent, that there was "simply nothing 'unequal'
about the State's using its peremptory challenges to strike blacks from the jury in
cases involving black defendants, so long as such challenges are also used to
exclude whites in cases involving white defendants"'0 3 because such strikes are
"based upon seat-of-the-pants instincts," even if they are "crudely stereotypical" or
"hopelessly mistaken."'" But Justice Marshall believed that the "'seat-of-the-pants
instincts' may often be just another term for racial prejudice."'0 5
The dissenting Justices may have overestimated the real impact of Batson on
the traditional prosecutorial discretion in exercising peremptory challenges. The
Court dictated only that peremptories "must not be based on either the race of the
juror or the racial stereotypes held by the party."'" It does not prohibit exclusion
of a racially biased juror. The Court has drawn a "distinction between exercising
a peremptory challenge to discriminate invidiously againstjurors on account of race
and exercising a peremptory challenge to remove an individual juror who harbors
racial prejudice."'0 7  More importantly, a prosecutor "who [is] of a mind to
9 See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 56.
98 See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 628-29.
9 Powers, 499 U.S. at 414.
'~ Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979); see also McCollum, 505 U.S. at 56
(noting harm extended to the state when its judicial system is undermined); Edmonson, 500
U.S. at 630 (extending harms beyond criminal sphere).
1o' Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,87 (1986). The Batson Court stated that, "[i]n view
of the heterogeneous population of our Nation, public respect for our criminaljustice system
and the rule of law will be strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury
service because of his race." Id. at 99. The Court subsequently has applied the Batson
framework to peremptories based on gender. E.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
02 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,220 (1965). The Swain Court stated that, "[i]n the
quest for an impartial and qualifiedjury, Negro and white, Protestant and Catholic, are alike
subject to being challenged without cause." Id at 221.
03 Batson, 476 U.S. at 137 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1o4 Id. at 138.
10' Id at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
"o Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
107 Id.
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discriminate,"' 8 can find built-in loopholes in the Batson framework to escape from
liability for racially biased peremptory strikes. To begin with, invidious intent, the
constitutional trigger for violation of the Batson rules, is difficult to establish. An
opponent of a peremptory challenge has the burden to prove that the proponent of
the challenge is motivated by the invidious intent to strike a prospective juror
"because of"' her race. The invidious motivation may be "derive[d] from open
hostility or from some hidden and unarticulated fear"' of the stricken juror's race.
In order to ascertain invidious intent, a court will have to engage in "a sensitive
inquiry""' into all available direct and circumstantial evidence, including evidence
of disparate racial impact of the peremptory challenge." 2 Ultimately, the inquiry
will entail judicial "evaluation of the [challenger's] state of mind."' "3 Undoubtedly,
the requirement of proving invidious intent is the Achilles' heel in the Batson
framework.
Moreover, the efficacy and usefulness of Batson's procedural framework
largely depends on the evidentiary significance of race-neutral explanations that the
proponents of impugned peremptory challenges are required to proffer. The
framework, at least in part, rests on the questionable assumption that race-neutral
explanations may provide a window into the striking attorney's subjective state of
mind or may at times even play a dispositive role in finding invidious intent,
depending on the evidentiary value that a court may place on them. The operation
of the evidentiary rules of employment discrimination cases, after which the Batson
proof framework was patterned," 4 can help to elucidate the probative value of race-
neutral explanations.
The Supreme Court originally established the three-step, burden-shifting, proof
'08 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)). The
Batson Court stated that a criminal defendant using the Batson framework of proof is
entitled to rely on the fact "that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice
that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate."' Id.
" Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion)
(quoting Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979); see also McCleskey
v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297-99 (1987) (discussing allegedly discriminatory application of
the capital sentencing statute).
"1 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991).
"' Batson, 476 U.S. at 993 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
n2 Id.; see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
"' Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion).
"4 The Batson Court stated "[o]ur decisions concerning 'disparate treatment' under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have explained the operation of prima facie burden of
proof rules." See Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 n. 18; see also United States Postal Serv. Bd. of
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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framework in its opinion in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,"' with the goal of
"progressively ... sharpen[ing] the inquiry into the elusive factual question of
intentional discrimination""' in employment practices under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.17 Under the framework, for step one, the plaintiff must
establish, by a preponderance of evidence, a prima facie case"" which "in effect
creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the
employee.""' 9 In the second step, "the burden shifts to the defendant 'to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." 20 The
defendant, by carrying this burden, rebuts the presumption created by the prima
facie case of the plaintiff. 2 ' Nevertheless, in step three, the plaintiff gets "an
opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons
offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for
discrimination."' 22
The failure of the defendant to come forward with a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason or a race-neutral explanation would ipso facto result in
a finding of unlawful discrimination.'23 But, what would be the consequence for a
defendant offering a race-neutral reason that ultimately is proved to be false? Until
recently, the Supreme Court maintained that a plaintiff who alleges intentional
discrimination could succeed "either directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing
that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."'24 The Court's
position seemed eminently sensible and logical. It is sensible because it recognizes
the reality that "[t]here will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's
mental processes"'' and that, except in the rare instance in which direct "smoking
gun" evidence is available, intentional discrimination can be "revealed only through
" 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
116 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.8.
"1' Title VII provides in relevant part: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer ... to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race. .. ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
"' A prima facie case is established by proving (1) that he (the plaintiff) is black, (2) that
he was qualified for the position that he applied for, (3) that he was denied that position, and
(4) that the position remained open and was ultimately filled by a white individual with
qualifications similar to plaintiff. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
119 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
120 Id. at 252 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
1 See id. at 254.
122 Id. at 253.
123 Id. at 254. "[I]f the employer is silent in the face of the presumption [created by the
plaintiff's prima facie case], the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff." Id. at 254.
124 Id. at 256.
i2s United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,716 (1983).
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circumstantial evidence."" This is precisely the rationale of the McDonnell
Douglas scheme of allocating burdens. It is also logical to draw a "presumption of
invidiousness" from the defendant's offering of a false or pretextual explanation in
an attempt to rebut the presumption of discrimination created by the plaintiff's
prima facie case."" The soundness of such an approach was articulated by the
Court in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters:"28
[W]e know from our experience that more often than not people do not
act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons,
especially in a business setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons for
rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the
employer's actions, it is more likely than not the employer, whom we
generally assume acts only with some reason, based his decision on an
impermissible consideration such as race.
2 9
However, in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,"0 a sharply divided Court
fundamentally changed the evidentiary significance of a pretextual race-neutral
explanation. In Hicks, Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority held that under the
McDonnell Douglas framework, the defendant has only the burden of production
(in step two) which could easily be met by "producing evidence (whether ultimately
persuasive or not) of nondiscriminatory reasons."' It asserted that while a
combination of a prima facie case and a finding of pretext may in some cases give
rise to an inference of discrimination, a plaintiff may not prevail only by showing
that the employer's proffered reasons are pretextual, because "a reason cannot be
proved to be a 'pretext for discrimination' unless it is shown both that the reason
was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.""' 2  The majority
emphatically maintained that the ultimate burden of proving intentional
discrimination "remains at all times with the plaintiff."'
Four dissenting Justices, led by Justice Souter, strongly criticized the majority
for abandoningthe long standing McDonnellDouglas framework that was carefully
crafted to enable victims of intentional discrimination to prove their cases by
126 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 526 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).
127 Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1181
(1995).
"n 438 U.S. 567 (1978); see also Hicks, 509 U.S. at 527-28 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing
Furnco to make the same point).
9 Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577.
130 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
Id at 509.
32 Id. at 515.
Id. at 518 (quoting Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,253 (1981)).
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indirect and circumstantial evidence. They predicted that the majority's new
evidentiary "scheme would lead[] to the perverse result that employers who fail to
discover nondiscriminatory reasons for their own decisions to hire and fire
employees not only will benefit from lying, but must lie, to defend successfully
against a disparate-treatment action.' 34  The dissenters totally rejected the
majority's "pretext-plus""' scheme as being "unfair to the plaintiffs, unworkable
in practice, and inexplicable in forgiving employers who present false evidence in
court."
13 6
The dissenters' resistance to the pretext-plus approach appears to have vanished
when the Court applied it to an age discrimination case in a less rigid manner. In
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,'" a case under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,' the Court unanimously reaffirmed
Hicks, holding that the employer's burden of producing a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason is only a burden of production involving "no credibility
assessment,"' and that a plaintiff's showing that the employer's asserted
justification is false "maypermit" a trier of fact to infer unlawful discrimination, but
"'will [not] always be adequate to sustain ajury's finding of liability."' 4 In Reeves,
the Court concluded that because the plaintiff "established a prima facie case of
[age] discrimination, introduced enough evidence forthejury to reject [defendant's]
explanation, and produced additional evidence of age-based animus, there was
sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the [defendant] had intentionally
discriminated."'' The Justices seem to be pleased with the pretext-plus-in-waiting
approach. Only Justice Ginsburg wrote a two paragraph concurring opinion to
emphasize the "commonsense principle" that the defendant's false explanation for
its action would give "rise to a rational inference that the defendant could be
masking its actual, illegal motivation."' 42
The McDonnell Douglas Court explicitly treated a pretext as "a coverup"'43
which "presumably implies a deliberate deception,"'" sufficient to support an
"3 Id. at 539-40 (Souter, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
'" The dissenters branded the majority's proof formula as the pretext-plus approach. See
id. at 535-36. ("This pretext-plus approach would turn Burdine on its head."). The source
of Justice Souter's terminology is the law review article by Catherine J. Lanctot, The
Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the "Pretext Plus" Rule in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57 (1991).
316 Hicks, 509 U.S. at 533.
'" 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
'3' 81 Stat. 602, as amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634.
119 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506 (1993)).
140 Id at 141 (emphasis added).
14" Id. at 153-54 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
142 Id.
41 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805.
,44 Robin Charlow, Tolerating Deception and Discrimination After Batson, 50 STAN. L.
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inference of invidious discrimination. Now, after more than a quarter century of
evolution of the evidentiary framework, plaintiff's proof that the race-neutral
explanation for adverse employment action proffered by the defendant was false
would not have the singular and conclusive effect of establishing invidious
discrimination. What it takes to win a Title VII disparate-treatment case is proof
of pretext plus proof of discriminatory racial animus.'" As described below, the
procedural intricacies in establishing invidious intent in peremptories track the
recently hardened proof requirements of Title VII.
B. Race-Neutral Explanation for Peremptories After Purkett v. Elem
In Batson, the Supreme Court emphatically stated that if general assertions of
good faith or lack of discriminatory motive by a prosecutor "were accepted as
rebutting a defendant's prima facie case, the Equal Protection Clause 'would be but
a vain and illusory requirement."" '  Therefore, the Court insisted that a prosecutor
"must articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried."' 147
In subsequent cases, the Court reiterated its conviction that "[i]n the typical
peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel's race-
neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed,"'' 4' stressing the
paucity of evidence bearing on the issue of the prosecutor's state of mind in most
cases.
REv. 9, 24 (1997).
141 Under the Hicks formula, a fact-finder could reject both the race-neutral reason offered
by the employer and plaintiff's proof of real motive and decide the case on an entirely
different reason that may lurk somewhere in the record. See Mark S. Brodin, The Demise
ofCircumstantialProofin Employment Discrimination Litigation: St. Mary's Honor Center
v. Hicks, Pretext, andthe "Personality" Excuse, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 183,209-
10 (1997). The Court in Hicks not only discards the McDonnell Douglas framework:
but two of the most basic tenets of American procedure as well-farst, that the
court is a passive tribunal, not an active player in the construction of arguments and
theories; and second, that cases are to be decided solely on the basis of the
evidence presented, not the conjecture of the fact-finder.
Id. (footnote omitted).
"4 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986) (quoting Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S.
587, 598 (1935)). The Court added that after articulation of a race-neutral explanation by the
prosecutor, the trial court must determine whether the defendant had established purposeful
discrimination. See id,
147 id.
14' Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991) (emphasis added). The Court in
Hernandez also stated that "[i]f a prosecutor articulates a basis for a peremptory challenge
that results in the disproportionate exclusion of members of a certain race, the trial judge
may consider that fact as evidence that the prosecutor's stated reason constitutes a pretext
for racial discrimination." Id. at 363. Thus, even a facially race-neutral explanation could
turn out to be race-based if it produces a racially disproportionate impact.
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The Court abandoned the Batson evidentiary rules, as they relate to race-neutral
explanations, in Purkett v. Elem,'49 "a law-changing decision."5 ° In Purkett, the
prosecutor struck two African Americans from the jury panel stating that one had
"shoulder length, curly, unkempt hair," and both had "mustache[s]," and "goatee
type beard[s]" that made them "look suspicious."'' The criminal defendant
claimed that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges violated the Batson
principles. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, reversing the state courts, found
that the basis on which the prosecutor struck the prospective jurors had no bearing
on their ability to perform as jurors and did not constitute "legitimate race-neutral
reasons for striking (a] juror," and that the prosecutor's explanation "was
pretextual.""' 2 In a per curiarn opinion, the Supreme Court reversed holding that its
"Batson jurisprudence"'' does not "demand [from the prosecutor] an explanation
that is persuasive, or even plausible" and that "[u]nless a discriminatory intent is
inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race
neutral."" 4 The Court cited the Hicks case to support the proposition that the
"ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never
shifts from, the opponent of the strike.""' The Court also asserted that the
persuasiveness of"a silly or superstitious reason" proffered by the prosecutor would
not become relevant until the fact-finder sets out to decide whether the opponent of
the strike had carried the burden of proving purposeful discrimination.'56
How could the Court rationally permit the prosecutor in Purkett to rebut the
presumption of racial discrimination created by the defendant's prima facie case
with a silly or superstitious reason? As stated by Justice Stevens in his dissent, "[i]t
is not too much to ask that a prosecutor's explanation for his strikes be race neutral,
reasonably specific, and trial related."'57 By treating the prosecutor's explanation
as irrelevant, the Court has left the determination of the critical issue of the
existence of invidious discriminatory intent entirely to the trial judge. This
determination, often made by assessing the "demeanor and credibility" of the
'49 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam).
15o Id. at 770 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'5' Id. at 766.
52 Id. at 767 (quoting decision of appellate court, Elem v. Purkett, 25 F.3d 679,683-84
(8th Cir. 1994), rev'd514 U.S. 765 (1995)).
153 id.
'14 Id at 768 (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991)).
"' Id. at 768.
156 Id.
117 Id at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It is also not too much to remind the prosecutor that
a criminal courtroom is not a stage to display his comical talents.
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prosecutor, 58 a task that lies "peculiarly within a trial judge's province,"'59 is
virtually impossible for an appellate court to reverse.1
60
Justice Stevens complained that the Purkett Court's treatment of the
prosecutor's explanation as inconsequential "demeans the importance of the values
vindicated by [its] decision in Batson.'' If this is true, the Court has not
supported its deviation from the Batson principles with any rational precedent or
cogent justification. The Court only cited Hicks6 1 to support the deviation in
question. Clearly, the Purkett principles of peremptory challenges now look
identical to the Hicks principles of employment discrimination; but, that reveals the
flaw of the Purkett principles. The Court should have recognized the difference in
constitutional magnitude between a race-neutral explanation given for a peremptory
challenge and that given as justification for an employment action. First, while the
constitutional value at stake in a discriminatory peremptory challenge is personal
liberty, the consequence of a discriminatory employment action is mostly economic
deprivation. 64 Second, the determination of the accuracy of a race-neutral
explanation of a peremptory challenge is based on the trial judge's assessment of
the credibility of the proponent of the challenge. In contrast, the veracity of the
race-neutral explanation for an employment action is verifiable by testimonial and
documentary evidence. Thus, by equating race discrimination in peremptories with
t See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365. "There will seldom be much evidence bearing on
[the] issue [of believability of race-neutral explanations], and the best evidence often will
be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge." Id.
"' Id. (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,428 (1985)); see also Patton v. Yount,
467 U.S. 1025, 1038 (1984).
"6 The Honorable James H. Coleman, Jr., Address at the Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub
lecture (March 5, 1996), The Evolution of Race in the Jury Selection Process, 48 RUTGERS
L. REv. 1105, 1133 (1996) (stating that "the Purkett impossible standard may become as
ineffective as Swain in preventing invidious discrimination in the use of peremptory
challenges"). Batson overruled Swain.
161 Purkett, 514 U.S. at 778 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162 It is quite conceivable that the Court has given up step two of the Batson framework
realizing that the evidentiary procedure is not judicially manageable since the prosecutors
routinely evade the neutral explanation requirement. See Michael J. Raphael and Edward J.
Ungvarsky, Excuses, Excuses: Neutral Explanations under Batson v. Kentucky, 27 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 229, 266 (1993) (stating that their empirical study of the working of
Batson over a decade has demonstrated that, "Batson's neutral explanation requirement is,
regrettably, a relatively simple hurdle for a prosecutor to clear. Even a prosecutor who has
dismissed jurors for racial reasons can concoct a neutral explanation for his actions that the
courts will accept as proof that his strikes were not racially motivated.").
163 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
' Racially motivated employment discrimination sometimes inflicts injury to the dignity
and sense of worth of the discriminated individual. But, injuries are compensable with
monetary damages. In contrast, discriminatory peremptory challenges always involve the
liberty, and sometimes the life, of the accused defendant.
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race-discrimination in employment, the Court may just be resuscitating the pre-
Batson practice of removing veniremen "based on perceived prejudices that do not
have a rational relation to the case to be tried"' 6 5-a practice it should have let
expire.
C. Discriminatory Prosecution and Sentencing
The doctrine of invidious intent is firmly entrenched in the equal protection
jurisprudence of discriminatory prosecution and sentencing. Prosecutorial decisions
are inherently discretionary"s and they traditionally are accorded a presumption of
regularity and propriety. 67 Since the decision to prosecute is at the core of the
constitutionally assigned function of the Executive,'68 it is generally immune from
judicial interference. 69 Nevertheless, the prosecutor's discretion, however
sanctimonious, is "subject to constitutional constraints,"'70 and a decision to
prosecute cannot be based on "an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or
other arbitrary classification."'' But even nominal judicial scrutiny of race-based
prosecutorial abuses is rendered difficult by the doctrine of invidious intent.
To adjudicate selective prosecution claims, the Court applies the "ordinary
equal protection standards"' 72 that require claimants to "demonstrate that the
[challenged] prosecutorial policy 'had a discriminatory effect and that it was
motivated by a discriminatory purpose.""' To establish racially discriminatory
effect "the claimant must show that similarly situated individuals of a different race
16s D. John Neese, Jr., Note, Purkett v. Elem: Resuscitating the Nondiscriminatory
Hunch, 33 HouS. L. REv. 1267, 1282 (1996).
'" See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
167 See United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926).
161 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (challenging the constitutionality of the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978 which authorized the appointment of independent
counsels); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (upholding enforcement discretion of
the FDA).
169 See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832 (discussing discretionary power of agencies to take
enforcement actions). The Supreme Court's traditional reluctance to entertain selective
prosecution claims is attributable partly to its relative institutional incompetence to review
purely discretionary decisions, and partly to its concern for the constitutional principle of the
separation of powers.
170 United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979).
17 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368
U.S. 448, 456 (1962) and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886)).
72 Id. at 465 (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).
173 Id. (quoting Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608).
[Vol. 9:3
SHRINKING DOMAIN OF INVIDIOUS INTENT
were not prosecuted."''
United States v. Armstrong,'" the most recent case in which the Court
articulated these standards, demonstrates the near impossibility of meeting these
high evidentiary requirements. The issue in Armstrong was whether a defendant
indicted for peddling "crack" cocaine had made the threshold showing that the
Government declined to prosecute similarly situated suspects of other races to
justify discovery for his selective-prosecution claim. 76 Among the evidence
presented by the defendant was a study, "showing that of all cases involving crack
offenses that were closed by the Federal Public Defender's Office in 1991, 24 out
of 24 involved black defendants,"'" and an affadavit reporting a statement from an
employee of a local drug treatment center "that, in his experience, an equal number
of crack users and dealers were caucasian as belonged to minorities." ' The district
court dismissed the case when the Government failed to comply with its discovery
order; the en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The
appeals court specifically held that the defendant, to obtain discovery, "may
establish a colorable basis for discriminatory effect without evidence that the
Government has failed to prosecute others who are similarly situated to the
defendant."' 7
9
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, maintaining that the threshold
"similarly situated" requirement was necessary because it "adequately balance[d]
the government's interest in vigorous prosecution and the defendant's interest in
avoiding selective prosecution."'" The Court faulted the defendant in the case for
his failure to identify similarly situated individuals who "could have been
prosecuted ... but were not so prosecuted,"'' to meet the required evidentiary
threshold. It simply dismissed the evidence presented in defendant's affidavits as
"hearsay and reported personal conclusions based on anecdotal evidence."'
82
m Id. at 465. The Court asserted that the "similarly situated" requirement was established
by the Court in its earlier decisions in Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 374 and Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198
U.S. 500 (1905). Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 466.
17 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
7 See id at 458. The defendant was also indicted for federal firearms offenses.
' Id. at 480 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171 Id. at 480-81. The selective-prosecution claim was also based on the allegation that a
disproportionate number of black defendants were prosecuted in federal courts which
impose longer sentences than the state courts. Justice Stevens noted that the defendant's
sentence in the case, if found guilty by the federal court, might be as long as a mandatory life
term. Id. at 479. However, "[h]ad he been tried in state court, his sentence could have been
as short as 12 years, less worktime credits of half that amount." Id. at 479 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
'7 Id. at 469.
,s0 Id. at 470.
181 Id.
182 Id.
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Even though the Court established the highest criminal discovery standard
imaginable and asserted that it would not be an "insuperable task to prove that
[similarly situated] persons of other races were being treated differently,"' l 3 its
opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, is devoid of any guidance or procedure
for the defendants to follow.'" It erroneously assumed that such information is
available for the defendants to pursue. It is common knowledge that law
enforcement officers do not keep records of individuals who should have been
arrested or prosecuted, but were not."5 Prosecutors are not likely to document their
discriminatory reasons for not prosecuting so as not to leave a paper trail for the
victims to trace. Prosecutors can always show why one criminal suspect is not
similarly situated to another. For these reasons, the best evidence a claimant of
selective prosecution could possibly produce is the type presented by the defendant
in Armstrong. Such evidence was enough to convince the lower courts and Justice
Stevens to conclude that "[tihere can be no doubt that [individuals of other races
who were treated differently] exist, and indeed the Government has never denied
the same."' 86
The most salient feature of the Armstrong decision is not that it sets a high
standard for discovery, which presumably suggests even higher proof requirements
to prevail on the merits, but is its failure to answer two critical questions. The first
is whether a defendant who successfully demonstrates discriminatory effect needs
to produce additional evidence to prove that the selective prosecution was motivated
by discriminatory purpose. An affirmative answer would lead to the exploration of
the subjective state of mind of prosecutors, a prospect which the Court generally
abhors on legal and policy reasons. The second question that the Court "reserve[d]"
for the time being is "whether a defendant must satisfy the similarly situated
183 Id
'" The discovery order of the district court tried to allocate burdens between prosecutors
and defendants. The district court
ordered the Government (1) to provide a list of all cases from the last three years
in which the Government charged both cocaine and firearm offenses, (2) to
identify the race of the defendants in those cases, (3) to identify what level of
law enforcement were involved in the investigation of those cases, and (4) to
explain its criteria for deciding to prosecute those defendants for federal cocaine
offenses.
Id at 459. The Supreme Court disapproved of the district court's approach, as well as the
concern expressed by the Court of Appeals about the "evidentiary obstacles defendants
face." Id. at 470 (quoting Court of Appeals decision, 48 F.3d 1508, 1514 (9th Cir. 1995)).
The Court also rejected a plea of the defendant to apply an evidentiary standard it adopted
in Batson. See id at 467.
"' Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MiAMIL. REv. 425,438 (1997).
186 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 482 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that the
district court had the discretion to take judicial notice of the fact that there were similarly
situated individuals. See id
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requirement in a case 'involving direct admissions by [prosecutors] of
discriminatory purpose."""' An affirmative answer to either or both of these
questions will not only doom a criminal defendant's chance of prevailing in a
selective prosecution case, but also demonstrate that the doctrine of invidious intent,
in its original conception, is unfailingly fatal.
D. Capital Sentencing
The doctrine of invidious intent effectively has rendered the Equal Protection
Clause inapplicable to claims of racial discrimination in capital sentencing. The
Supreme Court accomplished this remarkable feat in the face of convincing proof
that the race of defendants disproportionately influences decisions of prosecutors
and jurors to favor death sentences. In 1990, the United States General Accounting
Office, after analyzing twenty-eight studies on the subject, found that the pattern of
racially biased capital sentencing across the country remained "remarkably
consistent."'88 During the past quarter century, "[eighty-five] percent of the cases
in which the death penalty has been carried out have involved white victims,""8 9
even though fifty percent of the homicide victims have been African American.
Apparent indifference of the Court and Congress to such startling statistics has
created the perception that "racial discrimination in the administration of [the] death
penalty is inevitable and impossible to prevent, detect, and correct."',9
With the strict interpretation and application of the invidious intent requirement
in its decision in McCleskey v. Kemp,'9' the Supreme Court put the final nail in the
coffin of death penalty challenges on equal protection grounds."9 In this highly
controversial case, 93 an African American man sentenced to death for murdering
187 Id. at 469, n.3 (quoting Brief for United States at 15). It is troubling that the Court did
not answer this question in the negative. If a prosecutor confesses her discriminatory
purpose in a selective prosecution case, the Court should consider that the conduct is
violative of the Equal Protection Clause.
'.. General Accounting Office, Death Penalty Sentencing: Research Indicates Pattern of
Racial Disparities, 5 (February 1990).
89 Stephen B. Bright, Challenging RacialDiscrimination in Capital Cases, 21 CHAMPION
19, 19 (Jan.-Feb. 1997). Mr. Bright states: "Capital punishment, a direct descendant of
lynching and other forms of racial violence, remains one of America's most prominent
vestiges of slavery and racial oppressions." Id
'o David Baldus et al., Reflections on the "Inevitability" of Racial Discrimination in
Capital Sentencing and the "Impossibility" ofits Prevention, Detection, and Correction, 51
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 359, 359 (1994).
'9' 481 U.S. 279, reh'g denied, 482 U.S. 920 (1987).
'92 See 481 U.S. at 291-99 (discussing equal protection argument). In McCleskey, the
constitutionality of the death sentence was challenged also as cruel and unusual punishment
violative of the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 299.
'9' See Bright, supra note 189, at 23 ("And the McCleskey decision must be assailed until,
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a white police officer in the course of an armed robbery challenged his conviction
on the ground that the Georgia capital sentencing process was administered in a
racially discriminatory manner in violation of the United States Constitution. In
support of his claim, the defendant produced statistics generated by "sophisticated
multiple-regression analysis"' ' of over two thousand Georgia murder cases, to
demonstrate that "murder defendants in Georgia with white victims [were] more
than four times as likely to receive the death sentence as [were] defendants with
black victims.' 95
A sharply divided Supreme Court rejected the defendant's equal protection
claim because he failed to prove that the Georgia Legislature enacted or maintained
its death penalty statute "to further a racially discriminatory purpose"' 96 and
"because of an anticipated racially discriminatory effect."'97 The Court held that
the statistical studies proffered by the defendant indicated only a "discrepancy that
appear[ed] to correlate with race,"'9 that they did "not demonstrate a
constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital
sentencing process,"' 99 and that they were "insufficient to support an inference that
any of the decisionmakers in [defendant's] case acted with discriminatory
purpose.'2°
Justice Powell's majority opinion offered several process-based explanations
and normative justifications for the Court's decision. First, it emphasized the
impropriety of re-examining death sentences meted out by a process in which
different layers of decisionmakers such as prosecutors and jurors, individually and
collectively, make discretionary decisions after consideration of case-specific
variables.2 ' Referring to the demonstrated racial disparity in Georgia's capital
like Dred Scott v. Sanford, Plessey v. Ferguson, and Swain v. Alabama, it is rejected and
replaced with standards that acknowledge and respond to the influence of racial prejudice
in the criminal courts in general and in capital cases in particular.").
194 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 327 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id, at 286 (discussing
defendant's statistical evidence). The statistical analysis, known as the "Baldus study," was
prepared by Professor David Baldus and two of his associates.
"' Id. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
196 Id at 292.
19' Id, at 298.
198 Id. at312.
199 Id. at313.
200 Id. at 297.
"' Id at 296. Justice Powell noted, for instance, that "the policy considerations behind
a prosecutor's traditionally 'wide discretion' suggest the impropriety of our requiring
prosecutors to defend their decisions to seek death penalties, 'often years after they were
made."' kd (citations omitted). Further, "[e]ach juiy is unique in its composition, and the
Constitution requires that its decision rest on consideration of innumerable factors that vary
according to the characteristics of the individual defendant and the facts of the particular
capital offense." Id. at 294.
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sentencing, Justice Powell asserted that "[t]he Constitution does not require that a
State eliminate any demonstrable disparity that correlates with [race] in order to
operate a criminal justice system that includes capital punishment, '20 2 and that
"some risk of racial prejudice influencing a jury's decision in a criminal case" is
unavoidable.2 3 Moreover, Justice Powell maintained that even if there was a
likelihood of race factoring into some decisions, 21 the defendant offered "no
evidence specific to his own case that would support an inference that racial
considerations played a part in his sentence."2' 5 Finally, Justice Powell expressed
the fear that acceptance of the claim that racial bias had "impermissibly tainted the
capital sentencing decision" in this case would encourage widespread challenges
to other sentencing decisions on grounds of racial or other disparities.2 6
Four dissenting Justices vehemently disagreed with the majority and concluded
that the defendant had "demonstrated a clear pattern of differential treatment
according to race that [was] 'unexplainable on grounds other than race. "'27 They
placed particular credence on the statistics showing that a defendant in a white-
victim case was 4.3 times as likely to be sentenced to death as he would have been
in a black-victim case,20 8 and that even among defendants in white-victim cases, a
black defendant was much more likely than white defendants to be sentenced to
death.2' Analyzing the case under the evidentiary framework of Batson,210 the
Justices were convinced that the defendant had established purposeful
discrimination by showing that the totality of the relevant facts, "including the
history of Georgia's racially based dual system of criminal justice, '21 ' gave rise to
an inference of discriminatory purpose.
The Court in McCleskey not only rejected "powerful evidence ' 213 of a racial
disparity in capital punishment, but also seemed to believe that racial prejudice in
criminal sentencing is inevitable. A criminal defendant vulnerable to racially biased
sentencing would not be able to challenge her death sentence without proof that she
was sentenced because of the racially invidious intent of the prosecutor, jury, or the
102 ld. at319.
203 Id. at 308.
204 Justice Powell observed that "[sitatistics at most may show only a likelihood that a
particular factor entered into some decisions." Id at 308.
205 Id. at 292-93.
206 Id. at315-16.
207 Id. at 361 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1997)).
208 See id. at 355.
209 Id. at 353.
210 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
211 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 359 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
212 See id. at 351-52 (explaining the requirements for a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination).
213 Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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judge. That kind of direct proof is almost impossible to produce. Under the
McCleskey standard, "proof of racial discrimination in capital punishment cases is
beyond the capacity of virtually all capital defendants."21 This explains the finding
of an empirical study of capital cases, in which claims of racial discrimination were
made, that "[i]t is remarkable that in ten years of post-McCleskey litigation, not a
single claimant has prevailed."2"
I1. BYPASSING INVIDIOUS INTENT
In Davis, the Supreme Court simultaneously declared two distinct, but
interlocking principles: first, the "central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause
... is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race," 2' 6 and
second, "the basic equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a law
claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially
discriminatory purpose."1 7 The Court, in a subsequent case, claimed that it had
"repeatedly" reaffirmed the second "principle that an invidious purpose must be
adduced to support a claim of unconstitutionality. 218 Despite the judicial
declaration of its universality, the doctrine of invidious intent found itself out of
focus in the three-tiered standards of equal protection scrutiny.
A. Invidious Intent in Suspect Classifications
In its initial encounters with the controversial issue of the constitutionality of
explicit racial classifications in federally mandated affirmative action programs, the
Court seemed comfortable with using invidious discrimination as the dominant
criterion for its decisions. In Fullilove v. Klutznick,"9 the Court upheld a ten
percent contract set-aside program for minority subcontractors in federally funded
construction projects, on grounds that the program was narrowly tailored to
accomplish the objective of remedying the present effects of past discrimination.'
The Court also held:
There has been no showing in [the] case that Congress has inadvertently
effected an invidious discrimination by excluding from coverage an
identifiable minority group that has been the victim of a degree of
214 Baldus et al., supra note 190, at 370.
215 John H. Blume et al., Post-McCleskey Racial Discrimination Claims in Capital Cases,
83 CORNELL L. REV. 1771, 1807 (1998).
216 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,239 (1976).
217 Id at 240.
218 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 63 n. 10 (1980) (emphasis omitted).
219 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
220 See id at 480.
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disadvantage and discrimination equal to or greater than that suffered by
the groups encompassed by the [set-aside] program."2
As to the claim of discriminatory effects of the program on non-minority firms,
the Court ruled that "[tihe actual burden shouldered by them was relatively light, 222
and that Congress has unique remedial powers "to act on the assumption that in the
past some nonminority businesses may have reaped competitive benefit over the
years from the virtual exclusion of minority firms from these contracting
opportunities."223
While the majority opinion in Fullilove, written by Chief Justice Burger,
emphasized the "benign" or non-invidious purpose of the federal program and
judicial obligation to accord appropriate deference to determinations of
Congress--the coequal branch endowed with comprehensive remedial powers-as
the basis for upholding the program, it also made clear that the Court would always
be alert to prevent "us[es] of racial or ethnic criteria for the purpose or with the
effect of imposing an invidious discrimination., 2 4 But, such assurance was not
enough to prevent Justices Stewart and Rehnquist from writing a strongly worded
dissenting opinion. They argued that the equal protection standard "absolutely
prohibits invidious discrimination by government"' " and that "racial discrimination
is by definition invidious discrimination. 226
The disagreement among the Justices intensified when the Court, by a narrow
majority in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,227 decided to subject all racial
classifications to strict scrutiny, regardless of "the race of those burdened or
benefitted by a particular classification. '228 The Court claimed that "the purpose of
strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the
legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly
suspect tool."229 The Court invalidated a thirty percent minority contract set-aside
program of the City of Richmond because it failed to pass strict scrutiny by
demonstrating that the program was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
governmental interest.
221 Id at 486.
222 1d. at 484.
223 Id at 485.
224 Id. at 486-87.
221 Id at 523 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The equal protection standard of the Constitution
has one clean and central meaning-it absolutely prohibits invidious discrimination by
government.").
226 Id at 526 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
227 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
228 Id at 494.
229 Id. at 493.
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Again, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,"° a sharply divided Court
applied the standard of strict scrutiny to invalidate a federal program that provided
a financial incentive to federal prime contractors to select minority subcontractors,
declaring that "all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
government actor.., are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures
that further compelling governmental interests."23' The Adarand Court not only
undermined the Fullilove decision,"2 but also overruled its decision in Metro
Broadcasting v. FCC233 that applied the standard of intermediate scrutiny234 to
approve a "benign race-conscious measure[] mandated by Congress"2 that gave
racial minorities a limited preference in broadcast licensing.
Strict scrutiny of explicit racial classifications entirely and unconditionally
bypasses the doctrine of invidious intent. The Supreme Court has made clear that
"[a] racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively
invalid and can be upheld only upon extraordinary justification."236 Even though
the Court started out with ajustification in Croson that strict scrutiny is necessary
to determine "what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what
classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or
simple racial politics,"" 7 that reason sounds hollow in the context of affirmative
action which, as everyone knows, has a benign purpose, and has nothing left for the
strict scrutiny to "smoke out."' Realizing this patent fallacy, perhaps the Court
abandoned the smoke out justification in favor of a straightforward and enduring
rule that all racial classifications are suspect, and therefore subject to strict scrutiny
"whether or not the reason for the racial classification is benign or the purpose
230 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
231 Id. at 227.
232 Id. at 235 ("Of course, it follows that to the extent (if any) that Fullilove held federal
racial classifications to be subject to less rigorous standard, it is no longer controlling.").
233 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
234 Under intermediate scrutiny, a gender classification would be constitutional if it serves
an important governmental objective and is substantially related to the achievement of the
objective. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 530-35 (1996); Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982), Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
233 Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 564. In Metro Broadcasting, the Court said that it would
approve a race-conscious program even if it is "not 'remedial' in the sense of being designed
to compensate victims of past governmental or societal discrimination," if it passes
intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 565.
236 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,643-44 (1993) (quoting Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)).
237 488 U.S. at 493.
238 Id. Strict scrutiny was indeed "used by the Warren Court as a means to ferret out
invidious intent." See Sumi Cho, Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: Earl
Warren, Brown, anda Theory of Racial Redemption, 40 B.C. L. REV. 73, 148 (1998).
[Vol. 9:3
SHRINKING DOMAIN OF INVIDIOUS INTENT
remedial."239
It is even doubtful whether the Court's majority now differentiates between
"invidious" and "benign" racial discrimination at all. According to Justice
O'Connor, ""'[b]enign" racial classification' is a contradiction in terms,""24
reasoning that the classification is not benign to a person denied a right or
opportunity. Justices Scalia24 and Thomas take the uncompromising position that
"good intentions cannot provide refuge from the principle that under our
Constitution, the government may not make distinctions on the basis of race."242 In
contrast, Justice Stevens, in his Adarand dissent, argued that while "[i]nvidious
discrimination is an engine of oppression" designed to perpetuate a caste system,
benign discrimination reflects the opposite impulse--the desire to foster equality,
and that there is "no moral or constitutional equivalence" between the two types of
discrimination. 43
These disagreements among the Justices dispel any lingering notion that strict
scrutiny is in any way concerned with invidious intent. A government policy or
action, invidiously motivated or not, would now pass strict scrutiny so long as it is
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest. It is the compelling nature of the
government's justification, and not its invidious or beneficent intent, that
determines the constitutionality of a contested public act or policy. Therefore, in
deciding the constitutionality of explicit racial classification, the doctrine of
invidious intent no longer has a meaningful role to play.2"
This is not to say that strict scrutiny provides a safe haven for laws motivated
by invidious discriminatory intent. It plausibly could be argued that strict scrutiny
indirectly operates as a mechanism to filter out and exterminate suspect
classifications infected with invidious motives. It may be just as awkward for a
court to stamp its imprimatur on a law that is shown to have been motivated by
discriminatory racial animus as it would be difficult for the law's sponsor to
demonstrate a justifying, compelling interest to survive strict scrutiny. Even if all
these assumptions are correct, they would not alter the fact that invidious
239 Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 904-05 (1996).
240 Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 609 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting O'Connor's
opinion in Croson, 488 U.S. 564).
241 Croson, 488 U.S. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that no race-based program
is "in accord with the letter" of the Constitution).
242 Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
243 Id. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
244 This conclusion obviously contradicts John Hart Ely's theorythat the function of strict
scrutiny and "in particular its demand for perfect fit, turns out to be a way of 'flushing out'
unconstitutional motivation." JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUST 146 (Harvard
Univ. Press 1980). The Supreme Court's affirmative action and redistricting cases and its
pronouncements concerning strict scrutiny of explicit racial classification simply show that
Ely's theory is wrong.
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discriminatory intent is not the ultimate determinant of equal protection violations
under the regime of strict scrutiny.
B. Invidious Intent in Non-Suspect Classifications
Invidious discriminatory intent is nothing more than a tangential concern in the
review of non-suspect classifications under the prevailing relaxed standards of
scrutiny.24 The Supreme Court appears to display an unmistakable proclivity to
avoid giving dispositive significance to discriminatory animus even when it
constitutes the sole or dominant motivation behind an equal protection violation.
The Court tends to pay more attention to the discriminatory effect of unequal
treatment engendered by a non-suspect classification than its apparent or subliminal
motivation. The Court's widely popular decisions in United States v. Virginia246
and Romer v. Evans,247 decided under two different levels of scrutiny, appropriately
illustrate the avoidance of invidious intent-based judicial review.
1. United States v. Virginia
In Virginia, the Court considered the constitutionality of the all-male
admissions policy of Virginia Military Institute (VMI), a military-styled school of
higher education. VMI was the only publicly funded single-sex college in the
Commonwealth of Virginia. It was established in 1839 to produce citizen-soldiers
using its unique "adversative" method of training that emphasizes "[p]hysical rigor,
mental stress, absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy, minute regulation
of behavior, and indoctrination in desirable values." '48 Because it was originally
designed for male cadets housed "in spartan barracks where surveillance is constant
24 To trigger strict scrutiny, a law must either be based on a suspect classification such
as race, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), illegitimacy, e.g., Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), or implicate a fundamental right, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969). See also Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term Forward
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). Gender classifications are reviewed under
intermediate scrutiny that requires a showing that the classification is substantially related
to achieving an important governmental interest. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718 (1982). Gender classifications are sometimes designated as quasi-suspect
classifications. A law which does not involve suspect, quasi-suspect classifications, or
fundamental rights will be reviewed under minimum rationality standard which only requires
a showing that the classification is "rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose."
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985).
246 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
247 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
248 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 522 (quoting lower court opinion, United States v. Virginia, 766
F. Supp. 1407, 1421 (W.D. Va. 1991)).
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and privacy nonexistent," '249 the "adversative method," as it pertains to personal
privacy and physical education, would have to be modified to make it suitable for
women cadets." VMI has a "reputation as an extraordinarily challenging military
school"25' with a network of influential and beneficent alumni who are
"exceptionally close to the school.""2 But women never had an opportunity to be
a part, or share the benefits, of a VMI education.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals that VMI's
exclusively male admission policy denied educational opportunity to deserving and
competent women, and, therefore, it violated the Equal Protection Clause. But, the
Supreme Court rejected the appeals court's conclusion that the constitutional
violation could be remedied by establishing a parallel program for women, the
Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) at Mary Baldwin College,"
because the "VWIL program [was] fairly appraised as a 'pale shadow' of the VMI
in terms of the range of curricular choices and faculty stature, funding, prestige,
alumni support and influence."' '
The Supreme Court reviewed the VMI policy under a standard alternately
designated as "intermediate scrutiny" or "skeptical scrutiny,"" 5 which requires a
party seeking to defend a gender-based classification to demonstrate an
"exceedingly persuasive justification" for that classification.2"6 Virginia proffered
a two-fold justification for the VMI gender-based policy. First, it asserted that
"single-sex education provides important educational benefits" and contributes to
249 Id
250 See id, at 524.
21 Id. at 523.
252 Id (quoting district court opinion, 766 F. Supp. at 1421).
2" The parallel program, Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) was to be
established as a four-year state sponsored undergraduate program located at Mary Baldwin
College to accommodate twenty-five to thirty students. VWIL was conceived from the
Fourth Circuit's direction in the first phase of the litigation that Virginia may either admit
women to VMI or provide substantially equal educational opportunities to them.
254 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 553 (quoting appellate court, 44 F.3d 1229, 1250 (Phillips, J.,
dissenting)).
255 Id. at 531. Many commentators agree with Justice Scalia's dissent that the Court
actually elevated the standard to the strict scrutiny level. See Candace Saari Kovacic-
Fleischer, United States v. Virginia's New Gender Equal Protection Analysis with
Ramifications for Pregnancy, Parenting, and Title VII, 50 VAND. L. REV. 845, 915 (1997).
256 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 530, (quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. 511 U.S. 127, 136-
37 (1994) and Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)). To meet the
test, VMI had to show "at least that the [gender-based] classification serves 'important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives."' Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (quoting Miss.
Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 724, and Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142,
150 (1980)).
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"diversity in educational approaches.""25  Second, it argued that the VMI
adversative "method of character development and leadership training" is so male-
oriented that it would have to be modified at the risk of losing its uniqueness, to
make it suitable for training women.25
8
The Court found Virginia's justifications totally unpersuasive. The Court was
convinced that "[n]either recent nor distant history bears out Virginia's alleged
pursuit of diversity through single-sex educational options." '259 It brushed aside
Virginia's portrayal of the prevailing lack of public single-sex higher education for
women as "an historical anomaly, ' 261 stating that "the historical record indicates
action more deliberate than anomalous. '26' The Court held that any notion of
diversity that "serves only the Commonwealth's sons, [and] makes no provision for
her daughters" did not comport with the idea of equal protection.262
While the Court conceded "that women's admission would require
accommodations, primarily in arranging housing assignments and physical training
programs for female cadets, 263 it rejected "[t]he notion that admission of women
would downgrade VMI's stature, destroy the adversative system and, with it, even
the school"'2" as an unproven, self-fulfilling prophecy. The Court also intimated
that the VMI adversative system itself was based on over-broad generalizations and
stereotypical "notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females. 265
In sum, the Court concluded that VMI's categorical exclusion of "all women from
'citizen-soldier' training for which some are qualified . . . cannot rank as
'exceedingly persuasive ' '266 under the applicable standard of scrutiny.
Clearly, the singular focus of the Supreme Court in Virginia was the effect of
VMI's exclusionary policy on the equality rights and equal opportunities ofwomen,
rather than the invidious discriminatory intent of the Commonwealth of Virginia.
As the -Court framed it, "the question is whether the Commonwealth can
constitutionally deny to women who have the will and capacity, the training and
attendant opportunities that VMI uniquely affords."' '67 The Court's narrative of the
257 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534 (quoting Brief of Cross-Petitioners 20).
28 Id (quoting Brief of Cross-Petitioners 25).
259 Id at 536.
260 Id at 538 (quoting Brief of Cross-Petitioners 30).
261 Id. at 538. The Court described Virginia's slow and measured desexualization history
thus: "First, protection of women against higher education; next, schools for women far
from equal in resources and stature to schools for men; finally, conversion of the separate
schools to coeducation." Id at 538.
262 Id. at 540.
263 Id. That the Court stated that women's admission would necessitate such
accommodation is "uncontested." Id
264 Id. at 542.
265 Id. at 541 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)).
266 Id. at 545 (citation omitted).
267 Id at 542 (quoting United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 52 F.3d at 93 (Motz,
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history of VMI and of the gradual, measured desexualization of the Virginia system
of higher education was meant solely to refute Virginia's claim that the VMI single-
sex policy was a historical aberration and that its continuance promoted educational
diversity. 8
The Court was less interested in uncovering invidious discriminatory intent than
in bringing about equal opportunity for women as is apparent from several of its
statements. The Court recognized as an uncontested reality that "[s]ingle-sex
education affords pedagogical benefits to at least some students,"269 and it expressed
its unwillingness to "question the Commonwealth's prerogative evenhandedly to
support diverse educational opportunities."27 The Court called the inherent
physical differences between men and women a "cause for celebration, but not for
denigration,"'27 and acknowledged "that most women would not choose VMI's
adversative method." 2' Finally, the Court reiterated its position that sex
classifications are not per se suspect or presumptively unconstitutional, and that
they may be used as a means "to compensate women 'for particular economic
disabilities [they have] suffered,"' 2" to "promot[e] equal employment
opportunity," '274 and "to advance full development of the talent and capacities of our
Nation's people." 2" These permissive statements also suggest that it would have
been difficult for the Court to find invidious discriminatory intent in Virginia's
single-sex educational policies even if it had searched for it.
The remedies designed by the Court to assure equal educational opportunities
for women were modest and forward-looking. The Court ordered VMI not only to
admit women, but also to make "adjustments" and "alterations" to "accommodate"
women cadets.276 The Court even seemed to be willing to accept alternative or
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)).
268 See id. at 535 ("But Virginia has not shown that VMI was established, or had been
maintained, with a view to diversifying, by its categorical exclusion of women, educational
opportunities within the Commonwealth."); see also id at 539 ("In sum, we find no
persuasive evidence in this record that VMI's male-only admission policy 'is in furtherance
of a state policy of"diversity."') (quoting United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th
Cir. 1992)).
269 Id. at 535.
270 Id at 534 n.7 (citing Brief for Twenty-six Private Women's Colleges as Amici Curiae
5).
271 Id. at 533.
272 Id. at 542.
273 Id at 533 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977)).
274 Id (quoting Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987)).
275 Id at 533-34.
276 Id at 545 n. 15. The Court added "it is uncontested that women's admission would
require accommodations, primarily in arranging housing assignments and physical training
programs for female cadets." Id. at 540.
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parallel programs, provided they were substantially and qualitatively equal.2" Thus,
to achieve its paramount objective of gender equity, the Court would even risk
sacrificing the venerable equal protection principle that separate but equal is
inherently unequal.278 The remedial options made available to VMI were hardly the
types of retroactive or punitive measures befitting an invidious discriminator.
2. Romer v. Evans279
Amendment. 2 to the Colorado Constitution, adopted by a state-wide
referendum, provided that no department, agency, or public institution of the state
and political subdivisions shall adopt or enforce laws that prohibit discrimination
on the basis of "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships.""28 The amendment not only repealed existing anti-discrimination
laws to the extent they provided protections against bias to homosexuals, but also
prohibited the adoption of such laws "in the future unless the state constitution is
first amended to permit such measures." "' In Romer, the United States Supreme
Court, after review under the minimum rationality standard, held that the
amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause because the state failed to offer a
rational justification for singling out homosexuals by a single trai?82 to deny them
legal protections readily available to everyone else." 3
Amendment 2 was an expression of Colorado voters' aversion to, and moral
277 Id. at 553 ("Virginia, in sum, while maintaining VMI for men only, has failed to
provide any 'comparable single-gender women's institution."').
278 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
279 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
280 COLO. CONST. ART. II, § 30b. The Amendment in its entirety reads:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation.
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor
any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts,
shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy
whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person
or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences,
protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution
shall be in all respects self-executing.
See also Romer, 517 U.S. at 624 (citing the Colorado constitution).
281 Romer, 517 U.S. at 627.
282 See id. at 633 ("It identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection
across the board.").
283 See id. at 627 ("The amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific
legal protection from injuries caused by discrimination.... ."); id. at 635 ("Amendment 2
classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to
everyone else.").
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disapproval of, homosexuality.' But, as the Court found, the law inflicted
"immediate, continuing, and real injuries"28 on gays and lesbians by depriving them
"even of the protection of general laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary
discrimination in governmental and private settings."2" Therefore, it was not
difficult for the Court to hold that the imposition of such a "broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single named group 287 was so unprecedented that
the amendment "raise[d] the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed
[was] born of animosity toward the class of persons affected."2 88
Ifthe Court was convinced, as it claimed, that the amendment was "inexplicable
by anything but animus toward the [targeted] class," '289 and the deprivations and
injustices meted out by it were "unprecedented in our jurisprudence,"'29 then why
did the Court hesitate to let the law sink by the sheer weight of the unlawful animus
alone? The Court easily could have condemned the law by the straight application
of the doctrine of invidious discriminatory intent. But, the Court chose to invalidate
the law on the alternative grounds of "extreme overbreadth"29' and lack of a
284 See id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (maintaining that Amendment 2 represented only
the "moral disapproval of homosexual conduct, the same sort of moral disapproval that
produced the centuries-old criminal laws that we held constitutional in Bowers.").
285 Id. at 635.
286 Id. at 630.
287 Id. at 632.
288 Id at 634.
289 ld at 632.
290 Id. at 633.
291 Richard F. Duncan, The Narrow and Shallow Bite of Romer and the Eminent
Rationality ofDual-Gender Marriage: A Partial Response to Professor Koppelman, 6 WM.
& MARY BILL RTs. J. 147, 165 (1997) ("The constitutional flaw in Amendment 2 was its
extreme overbreath, not the identity of the group it adversely affected."); see also Lynn A.
Baker, The Missing Pages of the Majority Opinion in Romer v. Evans, 68 U. COLO. L. REV.
387, 407 (1997) (stating that "it is Amendment 2's unjustifiable and unprecedented scope,
its 'sheer breadth' that distinguishes it not only from other [legitimate] exercises of the
state's near-plenary power over its political subdivisions") (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at
632); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Amendment 2 Really a Bill ofAttainder? Some Questions
About Professor Amar's Analysis of Romer, 95 MICH. L. REv. 236, 253-54 (1996) (stating
that an "unconstitutional... breadth-based theory better explains both the Romer Court's
decision and the unconstitutionality of Amendment 2 than the theory [that it amounted to a
bill of attainder as] proposed by Professor Amar .... ).
Only Professor Koppelman interpreted the Court's opinion in Romer as one based on
invidious intent. See Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 89, 132 (1997) ("The core constitutional objection to Amendment 2 is
that, absent invidious motives, it probably would not have passed."). However, he admits
that no other commentators agree with him. See id. at 92 ("To my knowledge, however, no
one has been willing to suggest that the Court might have meant what it said: that the
Amendment was invalid because of its impermissible purpose.").
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palatable "public-regarding" 292 justification from the state. There are good reasons
to believe or at least to speculate, that the avoidance of the intent doctrine was
deliberate.
First, a decision predicated on invidious discriminatory animus in Romer would
have forced the Court to revisit its infamous decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.293 In
Bowers, the Court held that "the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in
Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable"294 provided a
rational, constitutionally acceptable justification for a law that criminalized
homosexual sodomy. According to Justice Scalia, "[i]n holding [in Romer] that
homosexuality cannot be singled out for disfavorable treatment," the Court
contradicted its "unchallenged" decision in Bowers.29 Justice Scalia argued, very
logically, that "[i]f it is constitutionally permissible for a State to make homosexual
conduct criminal, surely it is constitutionally permissible for a State to enact other
laws merely disfavoring homosexual conduct,"296 and that the only "animus" at
issue in both cases is "moral disapproval of homosexual conduct."297 Instead of
confronting and explaining the apparent inconsistency in the two decisions, the
Romer Court simply ignored the Bowers decision by never mentioning it.
Second, despite its fairly laudable statements298 concerning the evil intent and
deleterious effects of Amendment 2, the Court seemed quite unwilling to establish
an equal protection rule that invidious discriminatory animus against any group of
citizens solely based on their status or sexual preference is, by itself,
292 Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term: Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REv. 4, 62 (1996). Sunstein wrote:
The underlying judgment in Romer must be that, at least for purposes of the
Equal Protection Clause, it is no longer legitimate to discriminate against
homosexuals as a class simply because the state wants to discourage
homosexuality or homosexual behavior. The state must justify discrimination
on some other, public-regarding ground.
Id.
29g3 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
294 Id at 196.
295 Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
296 Id. at 641.
297 Id. at 644.
29 The Court's opinion begins with the recitation of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), invoking the legacy of racial discrimination to underscore the abhorrent nature of
Amendment 2:
One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this Court that the
Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Unheeded
then, those words now are understood to state a commitment to the law's
neutrality where the rights of persons are at stake. The Equal Protection Clause
enforces this principle and today requires us to hold invalid a provision of
Colorado's Constitution.
Romer, 517 U. S. at 623 (citations omitted) (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559).
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unconstitutional. The most sensible way to demonstrate the Court's profound
disgust for Amendment 2, which was characterized as unprecedented in our
jurisprudence, was to condemn it mercilessly as a per se violation of the
constitutional norm against laws motivated by invidious discriminatory intent. In
the alternative, the Court could have emulated the Colorado district court that
declared that Amendment 2 violated a "fundamental right... not to have the State
endorse and give effect to private biases."'299 Grounding the Romer decision on such
a solid and unambiguous constitutional principle would have prevented the likes of
Amendment 2 from future enactment anywhere. The consequence of the Court's
failure to do so may prove to be a costly mistake.
There is no consensus among commentators about the precise meaning or the
jurisprudential underpinnings of the Romer decision." Some scholars think that
the decision espouses a "pariah principle"3 ' or that it "embodies a ban on laws
motivated by a desire to create second-class citizenship.""3 2 But, Romer "does not
hold that moral disapproval of homosexual conduct is invidious or irrational."3"
The decision would not "preclude proponents of 'traditional family values' from
enacting piecemeal a series of statutes or state constitutional amendments that
would facilitate equally far-reaching discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation throughout both public and private sectors."'3° But, Romer would not
have been construed as a facilitator of such retail or piecemeal class-based
discrimination, had the decision been grounded on the doctrine of invidious
discriminatory intent."'
299 Evans v. Romer, 60 EMPL. PRAC. DEC. (CCH) 41,998 at 73,841 (Colo. Dist. Ct.
1993).
o See Louis Michael Seidman, Romer's Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of Warren
Court Activism, 1996 SuP. CT. REV. 67, 73 ("No one can write confidently about what
Romer 'means' because its ultimate meaning is yet to be determined by future judges and
litigants.").
30' Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 257,
257-58 (1996) (explaining "[t]his principle... forbids the government from designating any
societal group as untouchable, regardless of whether the group is generally entitled to some
special degree ofjudicial protection").
31 Sunstein, supra note 292, at 63.
303 Duncan, supra note 291, at 165.
3 Baker, supra note 291, at 407.
305 The reading of Romer as permissive of piecemeal discriminatory legislation against
gays and lesbians is inescapable in light of the Romer Court's failure to acknowledge or
distinguish Bowers. What the Romer Court requires of the legislators is an acceptable
rationale for discrimination (not a judicial command not to discriminate).
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IV. AUTOTOMIZATION OF INVIDIOUS INTENT
The doctrine of invidious intent, though effectively sidelined by the equal
protection standards of scrutiny, is not in any danger of becoming defunct. Besides
being strictly applied in the area of criminal law enforcement, the doctrine remains
ostensibly relevant to issues of equal protection violations in other contexts.
However, the Supreme Court seems to realize that the doctrine as originally
envisioned in the Davis trilogy is either too rigid to apply uniformly without
substantive modifications or that its application is not always conducive to the
interests of rendering justice as contemplated by the Equal Protection Clause. Thus,
as illustrated by the following segments, the Court has reformulated the doctrine to
make it fit in legislative redistricting cases, and has declared the doctrine
inapplicable in ML.B. v. S.L.J.3" in order to avoid an unjust outcome.
A. Legislative Redistricting
The Supreme Court has revised fundamentally the core meaning of invidious
intent in the context of legislative redistricting. In the revised version, the intent or
purpose of a redistricting law need not be invidious to violate the Equal Protection
Clause. The Court will treat a redistricting plan as unconstitutional racial
gerrymandering if race is shown, directly or inferentially, to be the "predominant
factor motivating the legislature's [redistricting] decision."30" The sole touchstone
of constitutional invalidity is the racially motivated "purpose or object."30 8 A voter
challenging the constitutionality of redistricting legislation is not required to show
that the legislature adopted the redistricting plan "because of an anticipated racially
discriminatory effect ' 3° on any identifiable group, or that she suffered an actual
injury by way of denial, dilution, or abridgement of her voting right. This is a radical
departure from the Court's "ordinary equal protection standards" which would have
required the voter-challenger to demonstrate that the redistricting plan "had a
discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose."3 '
The Court has been adhering faithfully to the ordinary equal protection standard
of invidious intent, even in review of redistricting legislation, until it abruptly
'06 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
307 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,916 (1995); see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,959
(1996) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (discussing redistricting plan of the Texas
legislature).
308 Miller, 515 U.S. at 913.
3' McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987) (emphasis omitted).
30 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,465 (1996) (citing Wayte v. United States,
470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)) (dealing with the constitutional requirements to prove a selective
prosecution claim).
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changed course in Shaw v. Reno3 ' and its progeny.312 In United Jewish
Organizations v. Carey,3"3 for instance, the Court rejected a constitutional challenge
to the creation of a majority-minority district because the challengers failed to
contend "that the proposed [redistricting] plan was adopted with the intent, or had
the effect, of unduly minimizing the white majority's voting strength."314 Three
dissenting Justices in Shaw exhorted the Court to follow the precedents and "be
consistent in what [it] require[s] from a claimant: proof of discriminatory purpose
and effect." '315
But, it is not difficult to see why the Court was unable to be consistent. As
described in detail later, the strict application of the invidious intent standard,
requiring credible proof of discriminatory purpose and effect, would not have
produced findings of racial gerrymanders in the Reno line of cases-findings that
were crucial in achieving the Court's avowed objective of outlawing race-
domineering redistricting at all costs. The Court has come to the conclusion that
overly race-sensitive legislative redistricting is antithetical to the doctrine of
colorblindness," 6 which is the centerpiece of its prevailing equal protection
jurisprudence.
However, race-conscious legislative redistricting is remarkably different from
race-conscious governmental decisionmaking in other settings, such as public
employment or contracting. Legislative redistricting is inherently and universally
race-dependent. Redistricting legislatures are invariably "aware of racial
demographics," '317 "just as [they are] aware of age, economic status, religious and
political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors."3 8 The Court does
not consider "[tihat sort of race consciousness [to] lead inevitably to impermissible
racial discrimination."3 9 Thus, it is quite apparent that there is no such thing as
509 U.S. 630 (1993).
312 See generally Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899
(1996); Bush, 517 U.S. 952; Miller, 515 U.S. 900.
"1 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
314 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 664 (White, J., dissenting) (discussing United Jewish
Organizations).
315 Id. at 671 (White, J., dissenting).
316 The Court derived the colorblindness doctrine from the Equal Protection Clause. The
"central purpose [of the Equal Protection Clause] is to prevent the States from purposefully
discriminating between individuals on the basis of race." Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642. Further,
"[i]ts central mandate is racial neutrality in governmental decisionmaking." Miller, 515 U.S.
at 904; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (holding Equal Protection Clause
requires strict scrutiny of racial classification). In Shaw, the plaintiffs "alleged that the
deliberate segregation of voters into separate districts on the basis of race violated their
constitutional right to participate in a 'color-blind' electoral process." 509 U.S. at 641-42.
317 Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.
318 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 646.
319 Id
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color-blind redistricting, and the Court expresses no qualms in accepting that
unavoidable reality.32°
Yet, a majority of the Justices seem convinced that considerations of race in
redistricting at times tend to stray beyond the zone of constitutionality. They are
unwilling to sanctify the creation of majority-minority districts, even if they
represent a power sharing arrangement between the powerful white majority and the
historically power-deprived African American minority,32' or a desire to fulfill the
state's obligation to comply with the federal Voting Rights Act.322 But, its
acknowledgment that race-conscious redistricting does not necessarily involve
invidious racial classification made it hard for the Court to condemn the creation of
majority-minority districts as unconstitutional under the traditional equal protection
principles. The Court had to invent a workable alternative formula to bring
redistricting within the penumbra of constitutional illegality. What it invented was
a formula that determines illegality solely on the basis of a theoretical distinction
between being aware of racial consideration and being predominantly motivated by
race.3 23 The distinction is premised on the flawed assumption that the degree and
intensity of racial consideration in redistricting could be measured empirically and
recorded on a scale of racial awareness to a racial predominance. The Court has
conceded that the distinction is "difficult to make" '324 and the dissenting Justices
categorically reject it as "unworkable. 325
Even though the distinction between racial awareness and suspect racial
motivation is grossly fallible as a durable equal protection standard, it served the
Court's immediate need to discourage the creation of majority-minority districts,
which it despised with hyperbolic metaphors such as segregation and apartheid.
320 In Shaw, the Court made the following observation: "[d]espite their invocation of the
ideal of a 'color-blind' Constitution, [plaintiffs] appear to concede that race-conscious
redistricting is not always unconstitutional. That concession is wise ... ." 509 U.S. at 642
(citations omitted).
321 See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,1038 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the
majority "entirely misapprehended the nature of the harm that flows from" the creation of
majority-minority district since they represent "a decision by the majority to share political
power with the victims of past discriminatory practices").
322 In Miller v. Johnson, the Court was specifically outraged by the practice of the U.S.
Department of Justice which "was driven by its policy of maximizing majority-black
districts," to insist that the states implement the policy to fulfill their obligation to comply
with the Voting Rights Act. 515 U.S. at 924; see also Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973 (amended 1970).
123 See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 646; see also Bush, 517 U.S. at958, 959 ("Strict scrutiny does
not apply merely because redistricting is performed with consciousness of race... [flor
strict scrutiny to apply.., race must be 'the predominant factor motivating the legislature's
[redistricting] decision."') (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 916) (emphasis omitted).
324 Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.
325 Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 116 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Since the overriding racial motivation in the creation of majority-minority districts
was so plainly obvious, and the state legislatures generally conceded that fact, the
awareness-motivation distinction presented no analytical problem in the Shaw line
of cases. But, the proposition that the predominant racial motivation of the
legislature could render a redistricting law unconstitutional can exist only at the
expense of established equal protection principles. The proposition fundamentally
deviates from the "general equal protection principle that the 'invidious quality' of
the governmental action claimed to be racially discriminatory 'must ultimately be
traced to a racially discriminatory purpose."'326 In fact, proof of invidious intent is
no longer a requirement for a finding of unconstitutional racial gerrymandering.
1. Relativity of Intent
All Justices ofthe Supreme Court agree that legislative redistricting is a complex
and intricate undertaking that implicates a multiplicity of factors and accommodates
a myriad of conflicting interests. Even though the Court's majority favors
reapportionment based on "traditional redistricting principles" such as compactness,
contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions and shared community interests, all
Justices recognize that consideration of race is an unavoidable and ubiquitous feature
of legislative redistricting. There is no suggestion in any of the cases that simple
awareness or consideration of race, without invidiousness, would have any
constitutional significance. In the words of Justice Ginsburg, "[t]o offend the Equal
Protection Clause, all [Justices] agree, the legislature ha[s] to do more than consider
race. How much more, is the issue that divides the Court ... ."32'
The Court's majority would cast the blemish of unconstitutionality on
redistricting when consideration of race becomes "the predominant factor motivating
the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or without
a particular district." '328 This theory provides neither a determinate benchmark of
unconstitutionality nor a dependable method to identify instances of legislative
overreaching. The theory also suffers from some fundamental weaknesses. First, it
discards the long standing equal protection principle that "racial classification,
regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only
upon an extraordinary justification."329 The only inquiry relevant to the principle is
whether there is a racial classification, not whether the classification is
predominantly racial. Second, the Court's theory does not necessarily demand
326 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,93 (1986) (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 240 (1976)).
327 Miller, 515 U.S. at 935 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
328 Id. at 916; see also Bush, 517 U.S. at 959; Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 905 (1996).
329 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,643-44 (1993) (quoting Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).
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extraordinary justification, even for the intentional racial classification. The Court
promises not to "apply [strict scrutiny] to all cases of intentional creation of
majority-minority districts.""33 Justices Thomas and Scalia specifically criticized the
Court on this point. In their opinion, intentional creation of majority-minority
districts is ipso facto racial gerrymandering since they represent "express use of
racial classifications" and they are "created 'because of,' and not merely 'in spite of,'
racial demographics."33'
Third, the Court's theory of gerrymandering relies on the questionable
assumption that the "mixed motive[s] ' ' that drive redistricting legislatures could
be easily unraveled to isolate racial motives. The Shaw line of cases themselves
reveal "the difficulty of disentangling the tightly woven racial, partisan, incumbent-
protective, and particular-candidate-favoring threads that are woven together in a
districting plan." ' The disentangling is made extremely difficult by the high degree
ofjudicial tolerance toward the common practice of drawing irregular district lines
for political and incumbency protection purposes. Incumbency protection is
recognized "as a legitimate state goal"334 and political gerrymandering claims "are
not justiciable."3" The Court declared, in no uncertain terms, that political
gerrymandering would not be transformed into racial gerrymandering, "no matter
how conscious redistricters were of the correlation between race and party
affiliation." '336 The Court's solicitude for political gerrymandering and incumbency
protection may amount to nothing more than the prudent recognition of the realities
of the process of redistricting, but it could easily undercut the goal of banning
decisions "to place significant numbers of voters within or without [] particular
district[s],"3" on the basis of race since those decisions could be easily masked under
political and incumbency protection rationales.338
330 Bush, 517 U.S. at 958.
3 Id at 1001 (Thomas, J., concurring).
112 Id. at 959. Note that in Bush, the Court characterized the suit as a "mixed motive suit"
because the state of Texas conceded that the creation of a majority minority district was
designed to achieve multiple goals, including incumbency protection. Id.
3" Richard Briffault, Race and Representation After Miller v. Johnson, 1995 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 23, 51-52 (1995); see also Bush, 517 U.S. at 1060 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating
that "traditional districting principles cannot be applied without taking race into account and
are thus, as a practical matter, inseparable from the supposedly illegitimate racial
considerations"); id at 1058 (doubting the "feasibility of untangling mixed motives").
334 Bush, 517 U.S. at 964.
335 Id.
336 Id at 968.
311 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
33' Racial and political rationales for redistricting could be used interchangeably to suit
the parties in litigation. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 920 (1996) (giving an illustration
in which Republican plaintiffs who were represented in Congress by a Democrat preferred
to be represented by members of their own Republican party; a racial discrimination claim
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Finally, the theory of racial gerrymandering is doctrinally unsound because it is
built on the shaky foundation of the relative motivation of the redistricting
legislature. To decide that race was the predominant motivating factor in
redistricting, a court has to compare that factor with all other motivating factors.
Only when the racial motivation dominates or prevails over all other motivating
factors can a court rule that a districting decision is violative of the Equal Protection
Clause. The constitutional significance of racial motivation is entirely dependent on,
and derived from, the relative weaknesses of other competing and interconnected
motivations. If other districting considerations "predominated over racial ones," the
Court would not subject the districting decision to strict scrutiny.339 Thus, the
comparative strength of competing motivating factors decides the level of dominance
of the racial motivation that is required for unconstitutionality.
There is no optimum or established level of suspect racial motivations; the level
of suspect motivation is determined not only by the number and types of competing
motivations, but also by their relative weights assigned by the judiciary. The Court
has long recognized that "it is extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the
motivation, or collection of different motivations, that lie behind a legislative
enactment."'" If so, it should be almost impossible for a court to engage in weighing
and ordering each of the relevant multiple motivations according to their perceived
significance.34 Any such effort is fraught with the danger ofjudicial arbitrariness.
In short, the entire concept of relative intent or motivation is ill-conceived and its
longevity has to be in doubt.
2. Irrelevance of Invidiousness
In addition to reconstructing the concept of intent, the Supreme Court's
redistricting decisions completely eliminated the requirement of invidiousness as a
condition for violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Since the districting laws are
generally "facially race neutral,"342 the key to uncovering impermissible racial
classification is proof of discriminatory or invidious intent. As observed by Justice
Stevens, traditionally the Court would apply strict scrutiny to a state action that
was used to pursue an unsuccessful claim based on political identity).
See Bush, 517 U.S. at 964 (stating "[s]trict scrutiny would not be appropriate if race-
neutral, traditional districting considerations predominated over racial ones").
"4 Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971).
14, The Supreme Court seems to think that weighing the relative strengths and qualities
of competing motivations is indeed possible. See Bush, 517 U.S. at 969 ("Here, the District
Court had ample basis on which to conclude both that racially motivated gerrymandering had
a qualitatively greater influence on the drawing of district lines than politically motivated
gerrymandering, and that political gerrymandering was accomplished in large part by the use
of race as a proxy.").
342 Id. at at 958.
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discriminates on the basis of race only if "that discrimination harmed an individual
or set of individuals because of their race. 343
Since the rights created by the Equal Protection Clause are personal rights
guaranteed to the individual, 344 "[a] predominant consideration in determining
whether a State's legislative apportionment scheme constitutes an invidious
discrimination violative of the rights asserted under the Equal Protection Clause is
that the rights allegedly impaired are individual and personal in nature. '345 It is also
a firmly established rule of constitutional adjudication that the Court will grant
standing to challenge a racially discriminatory governmental act "only to 'those
persons who are personally denied equal treatment' by the challenged discriminatory
conduct."' 34" The Supreme Court's theory of racial gerrymandering generally ignores
these core equal protection principles, presumably due to the Court's realization that
"[d]emonstrating the individualized harm . . . may not be easy in the racial
"2347gerrymandering context ....
The four Justices who consistently dissented in the Reno line of cases were
persistent in their argument that the plaintiffs in each of them suffered no
"cognizable injury. ' 348 They maintained that race-based districting is not necessarily
invidious and irrational racial classification since it has neither the intent nor effect
of harming any particular group or promoting irrational racial prejudices. 349 Justice
Souter reasoned that even in majority-minority districts, "[aill citizens may register,
vote, and be represented"' and no one is denied a right or benefit provided to
others. Justice Stevens captured the essence of the dissenters' position when he
complained that "[t]he majority fail[ed] to explain coherently how a State
discriminates invidiously by deliberately joining members of different races in the
same district; why such placement amounts to an injury to members of any race; and,
343 Id. at 1008 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
344 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,290 (1978) (Powell, J., plurality
opinion).
34' Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964).
346 United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 743-44 (1995) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 755 (1984)).
341 Hays, 515 U.S. at 744 (attributing the problem to the difficulty in discerning why a
particular citizen was put in one district or another).
348 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,659 (1993) (White, J., dissenting) ("Appellants have not
presented a cognizable claim, because they have not alleged a cognizable injury"); see also
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 929 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[A]ppellees have
alleged no legally cognizable injury"); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 921-23 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he injury that these plaintiffs have suffered to the extent that there has been
injury at all, stems from the integrative rather than the segregative effects of the state's
redistricting plan.") The four dissenting Justices in all the cases were Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg and Breyer.
3" Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1010 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
350 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 682 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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assuming it does, to whom." '' The dissenters' views mirrored the traditional equal
protection doctrine of invidious intent.
Instead of entirely repudiating the precedent-based arguments of the dissenters,
the Court seemed to recognize tacitly the continued viability and relevance of
invidious intent in redistricting cases. The Court claimed that a reapportionment
legislation that classifies and separates voters by race "threatens special harms" '352
by reinforcing racial stereotypes, inciting racial hostility, and by inflicting
"representational harms.""'3 In Miller, the Court made the startling assertion that
"the essence of the equal protection claim" arising from the State's use of race as a
basis for separating voters into districts is that the "action disadvantag[es] voters of
a particular race."" The Court has not adequately explained how the mere
"disadvantages" to voters of a particular race measure up to the level of
invidiousness, as understood in the multitude of equal protection cases.
The most unconvincing aspect of the "special harms" identified by the Court is
that they neither constitute harm to the equality rights of individual voters, nor are
they special. Race-based districting does not deny, abridge, or dilute the vote of any
voter, or deprive any voter of equal right to participation in the political process. The
triad of special harms specified by the Court needs to be analyzed to ascertain the
extent of their invidiousness. The Court asserted that race-based districting creates
the specter of stigmatic harm caused by the "offensive and demeaning assumption
that voters of a particular race, because of their race, 'think alike, share the same
political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls"' 3" and raises the
prospect of causing representational harms by sending the misleading signal "to
elected officials that they represent a particular racial group rather than their
constituents as a whole."3 6 The Court also feared balkanization of the society into
"competing racial factions" inciting racial hostility as a result of racial
gerrymandering."" These special harms are the manifestations of the beliefs,
"I Hays, 515 U.S. 750 (Stevens, J., concurring). In Hays, the Court denied standing to
the plaintiffs because they failed to live in the district that they claimed racially
gerrymandered. Still, the Court failed to articulate the type of injury required to challenge
an alleged racial gerrymander. That failure provoked Justice Stevens to write the concurring
opinion.
352 Id at 744.
"I Shaw, 509 U.S. at 649-50.
1s4 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995). The Court in Miller was referring to the
claim recognized in Shaw, which identified the "special harms" as the basis of the claim.
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 63 1. Therefore, the "special harms" identified in Shaw (namely,
promotion or perpetuation of stereotypical thinking about race, infliction of representational
harm, and incitement of racial hostility) are to be understood as mere "disadvantages" to
voters of a particular race. Id. at 661 (White, J., dissenting).
... Miller, 515 U.S. at 912 (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647).
356 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 650.
117 Miller, 515 U.S. at 912 (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657).
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attitudes, and perceptions about race that are already prevalent in our society and the
creation of majority-minority districts were in part designed to alleviate rather than
aggravate those maladies.
If the alleged special harms are serious and real enough to be constitutionally
significant, then it should be assumed that the racial and ethnic minorities have been
and continue to be at risk of suffering identical harms in the majority-white districts
all across the country. The history of the voting rights laws, including the Fifteenth
Amendment, and the records in the redistricting cases amply demonstrate that many
of the majority-white districts were originally created with the discriminatory intent
to deprive minorities of their right to equal participation in the political process. The
mere passage of time "is insufficient to purge the taint of an originally invidious
purpose." '358 Successive reenactment of the tainted redistricting laws by subsequent
redistricting legislatures, consciously preserving the racial demographics of the
original districts, could be considered decisions to perpetuate the original invidious
purpose.359  Therefore, the majority-white districts originally created with
predominant racial motivation deserve to be treated as racial gerrymanders, having
the capacity to generate as many special harms as any newly created majority-
minority districts," and the Court's ingenious exonerating devices-such as the
3. Toby J. Heytens, Note, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REv. 117,
147 (2000).
... The Supreme Court has indicated that subsequent legislative reconsideration of a law
originally enacted to achieve a discriminatory goal, may purge the taint of original invidious
intent. In United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), the Commonwealth of Virginia
argued that whatever discriminatory purpose, which may have motivated the establishment
of the all-male Virginia Military Institute, had been removed by subsequent reconsideration
of the purpose in light of the Supreme Court's anti-discrimination decisions, and adoption
of the educational diversity rationale for the continuation of the challenged single-sex
institution. The Court rejected the argument on the ground that Virginia failed to
demonstrate that the continuation of the single-sex institution was to further the claimed
diversity interest. See id. at 539.
Similarly in Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), the Court upheld the provisions
of the Military Selective Service Act of 1948 that exempted women from compulsory
military service. The Court rejected the argument that the constitutionality of the provisions
be examined in light of legislative history amassed at the time of the Act's adoption in 1948.
Instead, the Court relied on Congress' determination not to change the law in 1980. Finding
that Congress "thoroughly reconsider[ed] the question of exempting women from [the Act's]
provisions, and its basis for doing so." Id. at 75. The Court concluded that the policy was
not based on"a traditional way of thinking about females." Id at 74 (citations omitted).
It cannot be said that the redistricting legislatures across the country "thoroughly
reconsidered" the issue of transforming originally created majority-white districts into
racially integrated districts.
'60 Supreme Court cases generally "recognize the reality that members of the same race
often have shared interests." Shaw, 509 U.S. at 682. This reality applies to whites and blacks
alike. Individuals also tend to vote for candidates of the same race. See James B. Zouras,
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distinction between racial awareness and racial motivation or the blameless political
and incumbency protection gerrymandering-are quite insufficient to mask that
reality.3 6'
Reasonable people could genuinely disagree about the existence or extent of the
special harms that might be caused by the purposeful creation of majority-minority
districts, especially if they are created routinely and in large numbers, without
compelling justification. 62 But, there could be no disagreement about the nature and
Shaw v. Reno: A Colorblind Court in a Race Conscious Society, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 917,
977 n.490 (citing the findings of a survey by National Opinion Research Center, University
of Chicago, that "one out of every seven whites openly stated that they would not vote for
an African-American"). The Supreme Court does not offer any convincing rationale for
treating majority-white and majority-minority districts differently. Justice Stevens states in
his dissent in Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) that:
Unaffected by the new racial jurisprudence, majority-white communities will be
able to participate in the districting process by requesting that they be placed
into certain districts, . . . in an effort to maximize representation, or grouped
with more distant communities that might nonetheless match their interests
better than communities next door. By contrast, none of this political
maneuvering will be permissible for majority-minority districts, thereby
segregating and balkanizing them far more effectively than the districts at issue
[in the case], in which they were manipulated in the political process as easily
as white voters.
Id. at 1036.
361 The distinction between racial awareness and intent helps to shelter the majority-white
districts from equal protection challenges. See Briffault, supra note 333, at 51 ("The real
difficulty in applying [Miller v. Johnson's] racial-motivation test will be determining what
counts as a racial motive."). Racial motivations could be concealed easily in political and
incumbency protection gerrymanders which are perfectly constitutional. See Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (holding that manipulation of district lines to assure that a
political party has a majority in a selected district is not unconstitutional). The Court was
even willing to permit intentional drawing of district lines to safeguard the relative strength
of political parties in the entire State of Connecticut. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S.
735, 754 (1973) (stating it is constitutional to draw district lines "not to minimize or
eliminate the political strength of any group or party, but to recognize it and, through
districting, provide a rough sort of proportional representation in the legislative halls of the
State."). State legislatures are also free to create districts for the overt purpose of protecting
incumbents or their designees. See Race-based Districting, 109 HARV. L. REV. 160, 168
(1995) ("But the courts will read Miller to say that districts that are 'set aside' for black
representatives are unconstitutionally segregated by race, while districts that are drawn to
protect white incumbents are simply following traditional districting principles.").
362 The Court in Miller specifically emphasized its strong disapproval of the Justice
Department's policy of requiring states to "maximize" the number of majority-minority
districts as a condition for compliance with the Voting Rights Act. See Miller, 515 U.S. at
924. The Court stated that "[i]nstead of grounding its objections [to state districting plan]
on evidence of a discriminatory purpose, it would appear the Government was driven by its
policy of maximizing majority-black districts." Further, "[t]here is no indication Congress
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remediability of these harms; these are general and undifferentiated harms to the
electoral process, more appropriately preventable by federal public law enforcement
than piecemeal private litigation. 63 Individuals are not deprived of their personal
rights to equal treatment because the "mere placement of an individual in one district
instead of another denies no one a right or benefit provided to others."3" A white
voter questioning the constitutionality of a majority-minority district is not likely to
be more aggrieved or adversely affected than a black voter in a reverse-racial-
gerrymandering challenge to an existing majority-white district.
The grievance of the white voters against the creation of majority-minority
districts cannot be understood in terms of any cognizable harm or tangible
disadvantage. One may surmise that the essence of the protest is their feeling of
discomfort from being placed in a district in which they are the minority and from
the thought of being represented by an official of a different race.365 The source of
such discomfort can be simple stereotypical notions about minorities or sheer racial
prej udice-the kind of sentiments the Court's gerrymandering law seeks to eradicate.
These prejudices and stereotypes may make lasting gains and inflict serious harms
to society if they are allowed to masquerade as equal protection claims. In the
redistricting cases, the Court creates a "constitutional shield" for an equal protection
claim "that is itself the product of a habitual way of thinking about strangers." 3" In
intended such a far-reaching application of § 5 [of the Voting Rights Act), so we reject the
Justice Department's interpretation of the statute and avoid the constitutional problems that
interpretation raises." Id. at 927.
363 It is highly significant here to note that the Constitution specifically invests Congress
with the power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, thus enabling the federal government
to prevent state redistricting irregularities.
364 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 681-82 (Souter, J., dissenting). Whatever dignitary harms may be
attributable to the stereotypical notion that, for instance, black people "think alike," are
suffered by the minority voters, but none of them challenged the creation of majority-
minority districts. The so-called representational harm is simply a fiction. Representatives
elected from a majority-minority district are not likely to think that they represent only the
minorities. The Court had not provided any proof to support such a possibility. The
dynamics of the electoral politics would force elected representatives to pay more attention
to the interests and support of minority constituents, such as whites in a majority-minority
district, than to the majority race in the district unless the elected official belonging to the
majority race was routinely elected without contest or opponents in the election. A contrary
conclusion would reinforce the assumption that, in all the majority-white districts, elected
representatives generally ignore the interests and well-being of their minority constituents.
365 An individual's "constitutional fights are not violated merely because the candidate
one supports loses the election or because a group (including a racial group) to which one
belongs winds up with a representative from outside that group." Shaw, 509 U.S. at 682
(Souter, J., dissenting).
3" Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 120 S. Ct. 2446,2459 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens dissented from the Court's decision that permitted Boy Scouts
of America to exclude homosexuals from holding official positions in the organization and
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the process, .the Court has consciously autotomized the core doctrine of invidious
intent from its equal protection jurisprudence.
B. Non-Application by Hermeneutics
ML.B. v. S.L.J.36 " involved the denial to an indigent natural parent, solely
because of her inability to prepay over $2,350 in a record preparation fee, the
opportunity to appeal the judicial termination of her parental rights to the custody of
two minor children. The Court of Chancery, the trial court in Mississippi, found the
aggrieved parent (M.L.B.), petitioner in the Supreme Court case, guilty of serious
abuse and neglect and, therefore, unfit to have custody of her children.368 Even
though the relevant Mississippi statute required clear and convincing evidence of
unfitness to support termination decisions, the Court of Chancery described no such
evidence and detailed no reason to deprive permanently the petitioner of her
custodial rights.369
The petitioner promptly sought to appeal the termination decision, but she was
denied access to the appellate process solely due to failure to pay in advance the
preparation fee as required by the state law.37 The petitioner's efforts to proceed
with the appeal without paying the fee were thwarted when the state's highest court
ruled that "the right to proceed in forma pauperis in civil cases exists only at the trial
level."37' The petitioner sought review of the state court's ruling by the United States
Supreme Court on the ground that the conditioning of the availability of state appeal
argued that such prejudices cause serious and tangible harm to countless members of the
homosexual community. Justice Stevens stated: "That harm can only be aggravated by the
creation of a constitutional shield for a policy that is itself the product of a habitual way of
thinking about strangers." Id. at 2478.
367 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
368 Petitioner M.L.B. was the biological mother of two children by the respondent. When
the petitioner and respondent divorced in June 1992, respondent by mutual agreement,
retained custody of the children. In September 1992, the respondent remarried. In November
1993, the respondent and his new wife filed suit in Chancery Court to terminate petitioner's
custodial rights and to have the children adopted by their stepmother. After three hearings,
the Chancellor approved the adoption and ordered that the children's birth certificates be
changed to show the adopting parent as the mother. No description of the evidence
supporting this conclusion was in the decree. The Chancellor instead recited segments of the
Mississippi statute to declare that there has been "a substantial erosion of the relationship
between the natural mother, [M.L.B.] and the minor children" caused by "serious neglect,
abuse, prolonged and unreasonable absence or unreasonable failure to visit or communicate
with her minor children." Id. at 107-08 (citation omitted).
369 See id at 120.
3 0 The State of Mississippi grants civil litigants a right to appeal, but only on condition
that they prepay the costs for preparing and transmitting the record. MISS. CODE ANN. §§
11-51-3, 11-51-29 (Supp. 1996); see also M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 109.
3" Id. at 109 (citation omitted).
20011
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
on the ability to pay violated the "basic notions of fairness [and] of equal protection
under the law." '372
The Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, held that the
state had violated the petitioner's rights under the Equal Protection Clause by
denying her equal access to appellate review. In order to support its holding, the
Court had to resort to "anomalous" precedents, mostly involving denial of appeal
rights to indigent criminal defendants." Observing that petitioner M.L.B.
endeavored to defend against the "State's devastatingly adverse action"'374
372 The petitioner requested the Supreme Court to hold that:
where the State's judicial processes are invoked to secure so severe an alteration
of a litigant's fundamental rights-the termination ofthe parental relationship with
one's natural child-basic notions of fairness [and] of equal protection under the
law.... require that a person be afforded the right of appellate review though one
is unable to pay the costs of such review in advance.
Id. (citations omitted).
37 The Court's analysis of precedents concerning the "'age-old problem' of'[p]roviding
equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike,"' began with "the foundation case"
of Griffin that mandated free access to appellate review for indigent defendants, including
those sentenced to lesser punishment than death. Id at 110 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 16 (1956)). Then the Court cited the "key case" of Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189
(1971), which extended the Griffin rule to an indigent misdemeanant who was sentenced to
pay a fine of $250. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 111. In Mayer, the Supreme Court emphasized the
importance of access to the appellate process by defendants subjected to lesser punishments
not involving incarceration by stating that petty offenses could entail serious collateral
consequences to the defendant's career and reputation. Id. at 111-12. The Court also relied
on two cases involving termination of parental status: Lassiter v. Dep't ofSoc. Servs., 452
U.S. 18 (1981), which was sympathetic to the appointment of counsel for indigent
defendants seeking to defend against termination of parental status, and Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 748 (1982), which mandated a "clear and convincing" proof standard in
parental termination proceedings. ML.B, 519 U.S. at 118. The Court did have to contend
with cases that were not entirely supportive of its conclusion in the case at hand. For
instance, in United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973), the Court held that there was no
constitutional requirement to waive a court fee of $50 needed to secure a discharge in
bankruptcy; and in Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973), the Court found nothing
unconstitutional about an Oregon statute that required welfare recipients whose benefits
were reduced, to pay a $25 fee as a condition to file an appeal. Synthesizing the precedents,
the Court in ML.B. stated:
It would be anomalous to recognize a right to a transcript needed to appeal a
misdemeanor conviction-though trial counsel may be flatly denied-but hold,
at the same time, that a transcript need not be prepared for M.L.B.-though
were her defense sufficiently complex, state-paid counsel, as Lassiter instructs,
would be designated for her.
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 123.
114 ML.B, 519 U.S. at 125. The Court decided to pair M.L.B.'s case with Mayer, rather
than with Ortwein and Kras because ML.B. was trying to safeguard a fundamental or
"commanding" interest, and "endeavoring to defend against the State's destruction of her
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terminating parental rights forever, the Court placed her case in the category of
criminal and quasi-criminal cases "in which the State may not 'bolt the door to equal
justice.""'37
The Court's equal protection analysis was both unconventional and enlightening.
First, the Court appropriately ranked the parental interest at stake in termination
decrees as "sufficiently fundamental to come within the finite class of liberty
interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment," '376 and decided to subject the
state's attempt to deprive the interest to "the close consideration" 3" of the Court
within the "equal protection framework.""37 The Court then proceeded to examine
the constitutionality of the state's denial of equal access to the appeal process by
assessing and balancing the weights of the two interests involved: "the character and
intensity of the individual interest at stake, on the one hand, and the State's
justification for its exaction, on the other." '379 The Court found that termination
decrees "wor[k] a unique kind of deprivation""38 that is "' irretrievabl[y]
destructi[ve]' ofthe most fundamental family relationship." '381 In contrast, the state's
justification for the appellate cost prepayment requirement was no more than its
financial "interest in offsettingthe costs of its court system.382 The Court, therefore,
concluded that the individual interest easily outweighed the fiscal interest of the
state.
By straightforward interest balancing, the Court was able to accord M.L.B.'s
interest the dignity and significance it intrinsically commanded and to arrive at a
decision that was just and reasonable. Clearly, any alternative approach to
constitutional adjudication, not adequately sensitive to, or sensible enough to
accommodate M.L.B.'s interest would have produced an incorrect and untenable
outcome. If the Court allowed itself to be sidetracked by the purposeful
discrimination theory of Washington v. Davis,313 as desired by the three dissenting
Justices, 3M it would have ended up delivering a result favorable to Mississippi. The
majority wisely and courageously averted such a disastrous result by invoking the
Griffin line of cases35 upholding the principle that there can be nojustice where the
family bonds, and to resist the brand associated with a parental unfitness adjudication." Id.
at 118, 125.
311 Id at 124 (quoting Griffin, 351 U.S. at 24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
376 Id at 119 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 774 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)).
177 Id. at 116-17.
378 Id. at 120.
379 Id. at 120-21.
380 Id. at 127 (quoting Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).
381 d at 121 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).
382 Id. at 122.
383 426 U.S. 229 (1996).
384 519 U.S. at 136-37 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
311 See 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Griffin was meticulously followed in Mayer v. Chicago, 404
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kind of trial or adequacy of appellate review a criminal defendant gets depends on
the amount of money she has.3
Justice Thomas, writing for the dissenting Justices, took issue with the Court's
reliance on Griffin and its progeny primarily on the ground that the equal protection
theory underlying those cases had been subsequently abandoned by the Court in the
Davis line of cases.3"' The Justice maintained that the Griffin line of cases adopted
the "disparate impact" theory of equal protection by requiring the State to provide
free transcripts or court-appointed counsel to indigent criminal defendants.38 In
Griffin, for instance, the generally applicable state law requirement that the cost of
the trial transcript be paid for by the appealing party was invalidated by the Court by
"divin[ing] 'an invidious classification between the 'rich' and the 'poor.' ,389 Justice
Thomas agreed with Justice Harlan, who dissented in Griffin and related cases on the
ground that "the Equal Protection Clause does not impose on the States 'an
affirmative duty to lift the handicaps flowing from differences in economic
circumstances. ' '' 39 In the opinion of Justice Thomas, the views of Justice Harlan
were eventually accepted and the "disparate-impact theory of the Equal Protection
Clause [was rejected altogether] '39' by the Davis Court when it held that, absent a
showing of purposeful discrimination, "a law, neutral on its face and serving ends
otherwise within the power of government to pursue [will not be] invalid.., simply
because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another. 392
U.S. 189 (1971) (requiring the state to provide free transcripts for an indigent appellant
convicted on nonfelony charges when the state statute provided free transcripts only in
felony cases) and Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (invalidating state law under
which an indigent offender could be confined beyond the maximum prison term specified
by the statute if his indigency prevented him from paying the monetary portion of the
sentence).
386 See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18-19 (plurality opinion) ("There can be no equal justice
where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute
defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money
enough to buy transcripts.").
3817 See ML.B., 519 U.S. at 135 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The lesson of Davis is that the
Equal Protection Clause shields only against purposeful discrimination: A disparate impact,
even upon members of a racial minority, the classification of which we have been most
suspect, does not violate equal protection.").
38 See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18-19 (plurality opinion).
389 ML.B., 519 U.S. at 134. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting from Justice Harlan's
dissent in Griffin, 351 U.S. at 35).
'90 Id. at 134-35 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting from dissenting opinion of Justice
Harlan in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,362 (1963)); see also Griffin, 351 U.S. at 35
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
391 ML.B., 519 U.S. at 136 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing his own analysis of
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 373 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring)).
392 Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
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Justice Thomas's assertion that the majority in ML.B. was attempting to avoid
"the irresistible force of the Davis line of cases" 393 was no exaggeration. Indeed, the
doctrinal basis for Griffin and its progeny has been substantially undermined by the
Davis line of cases. It was the theory of equal protection articulated by Justice
Harlan in his dissenting opinions in Griffin39 and Douglas,395 that the Court adopted
in the Davis line of cases. Justice Harlan argued that "a law of general applicability
that may affect the poor more harshly than it does the rich" or "a financial exaction
which the State imposes on a uniform basis [that may be] more easily satisfied by the
well-to-do than by the indigent"396 would not be unconstitutional because "the Equal
Protection Clause does not impose on the States 'an affirmative duty to lift the
handicaps flowing from differences in economic circumstances.' 397 A contrary
theory of equal protection would, in his opinion, undercut "the constitutional power
of the State to levy a uniform sales tax, to charge tuition at a state university, to fix
rates for the purchase of water from a municipal corporation, to impose a standard
fine for criminal violations, or to establish minimum bail for various categories of
offenses. 398
In Davis, the Supreme Court replicated and endorsed Justice Harlan's parade of
horribles. Echoing the argument of Justice Harlan in Douglas, the Davis Court
maintained that a disparate impact standard of equal protection "would be far
reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole
range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be
more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent
white.''399 The Court in later cases carried the theme of Davis to such extremes that
it even refused to attribute significance either to the possibility that "a law
nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation" 4" or
393 ML.B., 519 U.S. at 136.
394 See 351 U.S. at 29-39. The Court in ML.B. called Griffin a "foundation case." ML.B.,
519 U.S. at 110. In Griffin, the Court invalidated a facially neutral state law which required
criminal defendants convicted of non-capital offenses who seek appellate review to pay for
the stenographic minutes necessary to prepare the appeal. The Court found the statute
violative of the Equal Protection Clause because it denied meaningful opportunity for
appellate review to indigent defendants. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 24, 27.
395 See 372 U.S. 353, 360-67 (1963). In Douglas, the Court held that a state violated the
Equal Protection Clause when it failed to provide counsel to indigent criminal defendants
who wished to appeal their convictions. Id at 357 ("But where the merits of the one and
only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of counsel, we think an
unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor.").
" Id at 361 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
'97 Id at 362 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Harlan's own dissent in Griffin, 351
U.S. at 34).
I" Id at 361-62.
'9' Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).
40 Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17 n. 11; see also Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244 (1970).
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to the severity of the disparate impact of a facially neutral statute on a particular
class of individuals.40' Therefore, it is not unreasonable to infer that the Davis rule
of purposeful discrimination, by unconditionally repudiating the disparate impact
theory of equal protection, has substantially undermined the jurisprudential
foundation of Griffin and its progeny.
But the Court in ML.B. downplayed the corrosive effects of Davis in order to
breathe life into the Griffin line of cases. First, the Court claimed that Davis did not
have such "sweeping effect" as to overrule the Griffin line of cases. 02 Then, it
distinguished the issue of disproportionate impact raised in ML.B. from that
involved in Davis. "To comprehend the difference between the case at hand and
cases controlled by Washington v. Davis," the Court said, "one need look no further
than this Court's opinion in Williams v. Illinois."4 3 In Williams," the Court, in
1970, invalidated a state law that permitted the confinement of a prisoner beyond the
statutorily prescribed maximum term in the event he fails to satisfy the monetary
portion of his sentence. It held that the disparate impact of the law on indigents
violated the Equal Protection Clause, even though the "statutory scheme [did] not
distinguish between defendants on the basis of ability to pay fines. '405 The Court
found that the fee requirements of ML.B., like the sanctions of the Williams genre,
"'visi[t] different consequences on two categories of persons,'; they apply to all
indigents and do not reach anyone outside that class."'
The main difficulty with the Court's analysis is its unfounded assumption that
the Williams decision, and its lineal ancestor Griffin, have miraculously survived the
Davis decision unscathed. First, no saving language in Davis even remotely suggests
that its rule of purposeful discrimination will exempt disproportionate impact of the
Griffin-Williams variety. As the Court stated in Feeney, "purposeful discrimination,"
not the severity of the impact of a neutral law on women or racial minorities, is "the
condition that offends the Constitution"47 under the regime of Davis. Moreover, the
Court has undermined the force and effectiveness of Williams by several decisions
401 The Court in Feeney, for instance, refused to invalidate a law that gave employment
preference to veterans even after finding that "[t]he impact of the veterans' preference law
upon the public employment opportunities of women has thus been severe." Pers. Adm'r of
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,271 (1979).
4o2 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 126 (1996). The Court specifically cited two cases:
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), and Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), to
support its contention that the Griffin line of cases are alive and well after Davis. M.L.B. at
519 U.S. at 127.
" Id. at 126 (citations omitted).
404 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
405 Id at 242.
,6 ML.B., 519 U.S. at 127 (citations omitted) (quoting Williams, 399 U.S. at 242).
407 Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979) (quoting Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)).
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that directly address the rights of indigent criminal defendants. United States v.
MacCollom, °s decided just three days after Washington v. Davis, provides a
convincing illustration. In MacCollom, the Court rejected an equal protection
challenge to a federal statute that provided that an indigent could not qualify for a
free trial transcript for the purpose of collateral review unless a court certified that
the challenge to the conviction was not frivolous and that the transcript was
necessary to prepare the review petition. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented,
maintaining that requiring a criminal defendant to show anything more than
indigency to get a free transcript was a "plain departure from Griffin and its
progeny."4' The Justices quoted Williams to assert that the MacCollom "decision
emptie[d] [] all promise the Court's assurance only six years ago that decisions
applying Grffin 'have pointedly demonstrated that the passage of time has
heightened rather than weakened the attempts [by this Court] to mitigate the
disparate treatment of indigents in the criminal process.""'
The Court in ML.B. cited two of its prior decisions to demonstrate the
continuing vitality of the Griffin line of cases after Davis. The Court claimed that
in Ross v. Moffit 4" six of the seven Justices from the majority in Davis, just two
terms before Davis, relied on the "decisions in Griffin and related cases to hold that
'the State cannot adopt procedures which [deny] an indigent [a] 'meaningful
appeal.""'' The Court also cited Bearden v. Georgiad3 as a decision "adhering in
1983 to 'Griffin's principle of 'equal justice."' 4 " But, the problem with these cases
is that they demonstrate just the opposite of what the Court claimed that they did.
In Ross, an indigent defendant claimed that he had a constitutional right to
appointed counsel to seek discretionary review of his criminal conviction in the
highest court of North Carolina. He argued that his claim was supported by the
Griffin line of cases, including Burns v. Ohio,4" that held that "once the State
chooses to establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents
from access to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty.4 6 However,
the Supreme Court recited an unbroken chain of precedents in which it invalidated
408 426 U.S. 317 (1976).
409 Id at 332.
40 Id. at 334 (quoting Williams, 399 U.S. at 241).
411 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
412 519 U.S. at 127 n. 16 (quoting Ross, 417 U.S. at 612).
411 461 U.S. 660 (1993).
414 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127 (1996) (quoting Bearden, 461 U.S. at 664-65) ("In
sum, under respondent's reading of Washington v. Davis, our overruling of the Griffin line
of cases would be two decades overdue. It suffices to point out that this Court has not so
conceived the meaning and effect of our 1976 'disproportionate impact' precedent.").
41 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
416 Id. at 257.
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financial barriers to appellate process, 17 but then rejected the defendant's claim
maintaining that the question of indigents' right to procedural equality was "not one
of absolutes, but one of degrees"418 and that the Equal Protection Clause did not
require states to "equalize economic conditions."'4t9 The Court's opinion, written by
then-Justice Rehnquist, concluded that by the state's failure to provide appointed
counsel for discretionary review in the case, the defendant was only "somewhat
handicapped in comparison with a wealthy defendant who has counsel assisting him
in every conceivable manner at every stage in the proceeding."4" ° Thus, Ross did not
subscribe to the Griffin principle of equality. Chief Justice Rehnquist's agreement
with Justice Thomas's argument in M.L.B. that after Davis, "the equal protection
theory underlying the Griffin line of cases [is not] viable"42' makes such a conclusion
easily unassailable.
Similarly, the central holding ofBearden v. Georgia"2 hardly would support the
assertion that it faithfully adhered to the Griffin principle of equal justice. In
Bearden, a criminal defendant, who was ordered to pay a $500 fine and $250 in
restitution, challenged as violative of the Equal Protection Clause, the decision of the
trial court to revoke his probation and impose a prison term for failure to pay a
portion of the fine and restitution. His argument relied on the holdings of Williams
v. Illinois423 and Tate v. Short4 that a state cannot impose "a fine as a sentence and
then automatically convert[ ] it into a jail term solely because the defendant is
indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full."" The Court, in an opinion by
Justice O'Connor, held that the revocation decision of the trial court in the case was
417 See Ross, 417 U.S. at 599. In addition to Griffin, the Court cited Draper v.
Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) (striking down a law which made an indigent defendant's
right to a free trial transcript contingent upon the certification by the trial court that the
contentions in the appeal would not be frivolous); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963)
(invalidating a law that provided a free transcript only to a public defender, because the
indigent defendant would have no recourse if the public defender chooses not to request a
transcript); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (holding that a state must provide
to an indigent an appointed counsel for pursuing his first appeal as of right); Smith v.
Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (invalidating a filing fee required to process a state habeas
corpus application by a convicted defendant); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); and
McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894). The Court distinguished the right to counsel to
pursue a first appeal in Douglas from the right to counsel claimed in Ross to pursue a
discretionary appeal. See Ross, 417 U.S. at 599.
418 Ross, 417 U.S. at 612.
419 id
420 Id. at 616.
421 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 133 (1996).
422 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
423 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
424 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
425 Id at 398 (quoting Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 509 (1970)).
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"fundamentally unfair" because the Court failed to explore alternatives to
imprisonment and to consider the extent of the efforts made by the defendant to
satisfy the fine.426 The Court then established a brand new rule that "[o]nly if...
alternatives to imprisonment are not adequate in a particular situation to meet the
State's interests in punishment and deterrence may the State imprison a probationer
who has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay."4 7
Despite the Court's effort to sketch it in a moral canvas with Griffin- Williams
imprints, the new Bearden rule plainly permits a trial court to impose on an indigent
a prison term in lieu of unpaid fines. The requirement that the sentencing court find
non-prison alternatives adequate to achieve the penological interests of the State is
not likely to operate as a restraint on a state court already inclined to impose a prison
term. Moreover, as observed by four concurring Justices, no support exists in the
Supreme Court cases or in the Constitution for this "novel requirement."42 Of
course, had the Court followed the Griffin-Williams principles, there would have
been no need for such a requirement because the conversion of a fine, unpaid by an
indigent, would be automatically unconstitutional.
In M.L.B., the Supreme Court made an admirable effort to restore the theory of
disproportionate impact to its rightful place in equal protection jurisprudence. The
Court endeavored to accomplish its goal, quite appropriately, by rehabilitating
Griffin, a seminal decision etched in solid moral and ethical foundation. The Court's
half-hearted attempt to demonstrate that Griffin was alive and well all along under
the Ross-Bearden line of cases was unnecessary and simply unconvincing. The
undeniable truth is, as Justice Thomas has asserted repeatedly, "[t]hat the doctrinal
basis for Griffin and its progeny ha[d] largely been undermined"4 9 by Davis when
it unconditionally rejected the equal protection theory of disproportionate impact in
a racial discrimination setting. Thus, in the ultimate analysis, rehabilitation of
Griffin would be impossible without simultaneously repudiating the holding of
Davis, at least to the extent that it pertains to disproportionate impact of facially
neutral laws on indigents. Therefore, it would be entirely reasonable to construe the
Court's holding in ML.B. as a rejection of Davis by implication and as an
endorsement of the disproportionate impact theory.43
426 Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666.
421 Id at 672.
428 Id at 676 (White, J., concurring).
429 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 374 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also M.L.B.
v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 133 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("I do not think that the equal
protection theory underlying the Griffin line of cases remains viable.").
430 The Court made a cursory statement, suggesting that the Griffin-Williams-ML.B.
statutes entailed "not merely disproportionate in impact," but they "visi[ted] different
consequences on two categories of persons" based on their ability to pay; that "they
appl[ied] to all indigents and [did] not reach anyone outside that class." ML.B., 519 U.S. at
127 (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242 (1970)). The Court cannot be taken
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CONCLUSION
As the foregoing analysis of the cases reveals, the Supreme Court's application
of the invidious intent doctrine has been erratic and inconsistent. As a result, the
meaning and status of the doctrine in equal protection jurisprudence have become
increasingly uncertain. The apparent decline of the intent doctrine may be the
natural consequence of the ascendance of the doctrine of neutrality. It is no accident
that the Court rarely repeats the assertion that "purposeful discrimination is 'the
condition that offends the Constitution""'31 or the Davis aphorism that the "central
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the
prevention of official conduct [invidiously] discriminating on the basis of race."432
Instead, the Court now prefers to emphasize that the "central mandate [of the Equal
Protection Clause] is racial neutrality in governmental decisionmaking. ''433 The
Court seemed to confirm this doctrinal shift when it recently announced that Justice
Harlan's memorable statement inPlessyv. Ferguson,43, that the Constitution "neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens 4 35 is now "understood to state a
seriously when it makes such flimsy distinctions. The statute in ML.B. did apply to any and
all persons who desired to take a discretionary appeal from the trial court decisions. It hardly
impacted adversely on affluent persons who need not worry about the cost involved; it
adversely impacted individuals of the middle class who may have to undergo considerable
economic hardship to meet the cost requirement; and, it severely impacted the indigent who
cannot afford the cost at all. Thus, the statute visits different consequences on at least three
categories of individuals. But the Davis rule, as discussed earlier, does not recognize
distinctions based on the intensity or severity of the impact. See supra notes 24-25 and
accompanying text. Therefore, the only way the Court could reconcile its M.L.B. decision
with Washington v. Davis was to repudiate the latter decision. The Court's attempt to
distance ML.B. from Davis is nevertheless understandable as a pragmatic measure to gain
approval of the Court's majority without opening up the difficult jurisprudential debate
concerning the soundness of Davis. But what is significant in ML.B. is that the Court
recognized the devastating disproportionate impact of a facially neutral statute on the poor
without having to prove invidious intent, and in doing so it rebuked the basic rationale of
Davis that recognition of disproportionate impact would invite a deluge of litigation seeking
invalidation of revenue, custom, and regulatory laws in a way that imperils the rule of law.
The Court rejected such an argument in M.L.B. after noting that "[riespondents and the
dissenters urge that we will open floodgates if we do not rigidly restrict Griffin to cases
typed 'criminal."' ML.B., 519 U.S. at 127. That was a pointed and significant rejection.
31 Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979) (quotingSwann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)).
432 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (emphasis added); see also
Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 484 (1982).
..3 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995) (emphasis added).
414 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
431 Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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commitment to the law's neutrality."436
The doctrine of invidious intent seems to be ripe to be metamorphosed into the
doctrine of neutrality. At times, the Supreme Court seemed to be inching toward
formalization of such a transformation by adopting the same framework for
neutrality inquiry as the Court has been using all along for intent inquiry. In Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,4" for instance, the Court utilized
"an equal protection mode of analysis"43 to determine whether the object of the city
ordinances at issue was neutral for the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment. The analysis entailed an assessment of "both direct and
circumstantial evidence"439 and all of the "objective factors [that] bear on the
question of discriminatory object."' The inquiry led the Court to conclude that the
impugned ordinances were not neutral as they were "enacted 'because of,' not
merely 'in spite of,' their suppression of [the adversely affected] religious
practice.""' Obviously, the Court saw no discernible difference between
discriminatory object, which violates neutrality under the Free Exercise Clause, and
invidious discriminatory intent, which violates the Equal Protection Clause. One
possible inference that could be drawn from this equation is that a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause could be predicated on proof of discriminatory object,
instead of invidious discriminatory intent.
Alternately, if we rule out the theoretical possibility of assimilation of the
doctrine of intent into the doctrine of neutrality, then we must demarcate the
respective spheres of operation of the two doctrines. The central importance of
neutrality in current equal protection jurisprudence a fortiori denies co-equal status
to the doctrine of intent. Moreover, neutrality is a much broader and more inclusive
concept than the concept of invidious intent. The essence of neutrality is absolute
impartiality in governmental decisionmaking. A law can be non-neutral without
being discriminatory. If it disproportionately and unreasonably burdens or
disadvantages an identifiable group, the law is not neutral to the affected group.
Discrimination, intentional or not, is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition of
436 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).
437 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
4138 Id at 540 (quoting concurrence in Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y. City, 397 U.S. 664,
696 (1970)).
411 Id (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1997)).
The Court further adopted the same evidentiary components that it identified in Arlington
Heights. See id at 540 ("Relevant evidence includes, among other things, the historical
background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of events leading to the
enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history,
including contemporaneous statements made by members of the decisionmaking body.").
440 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540.
' Id. (quoting Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
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non-neutrality.442 Intentional discrimination is the prototype of non-neutrality, but
not all instances of non-neutrality are the product of intentional discrimination.
Therefore, the Supreme Court logically could adopt neutrality exclusively as the
guiding principle of the Equal Protection Clause and dispense with the intent
doctrine without sacrificing its value and substance. But the Court has not yet taken
that decisive step toward retiring the intent doctrine. On the contrary, as we have
seen in the context of criminal law enforcement, the Court is determined to keep the
intent doctrine alive, despite its apparent incongruity with the emerging neutrality
doctrine.
It is entirely conceivable that the intent doctrine can coexist as a subset of the
neutrality doctrine for the foreseeable future for carefully defined purposes. For
instance, invidious intent can be a significant factor in determining the propriety and
severity of sanctions for breaches of equal protection neutrality. The Supreme Court
decision in Guardians Ass 'n v. Civil Service Commission of the City of New York" 3
could be an appropriate model. In that case, the Court held that a private Title VI'
plaintiff was not entitled to compensatory relief in the absence of discriminatory
animus and that "unless discriminatory intent is shown, declaratory and limited
injunctive relief should be the only available private remedies for Title VI
violations.""' 5 By making the same principle of liability as the generally applicable
remedial rule of Equal Protection Clause the Court could simultaneously accomplish
the original. purpose of the intent doctrine and further the goal of neutrality.
To make the intent doctrine compatible with the neutrality doctrine, the Court
needs to rise above the usual interpretive gymnastics. It is incumbent upon the Court
to revamp the intent doctrine precisely and delineate its sphere of operation within
the framework of neutrality. The area of employment discrimination illustrates the
point. For over three decades, the Supreme Court has permitted a Title VII"6
plaintiff to seek remedies for employment discrimination either by proving the
invidious discriminatory intent of the employer"' or the disparate impact of the
challenged employment practice." However, the Court steadfastly maintains that
42 See K.G. Jan Pillai, Neutrality of the Equal Protection Clause, 27 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 89 (1999).
443 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
"' Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-7. Section 601 of the Act
provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." §
2000d.
44 Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 584 (White, J., plurality opinion).
446 Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17.
447 See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (discussing
presumptions and burden of proof required to show intentional discrimination).
448 The Court first recognized a cause of action based on disparate impact in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). For the difference between the two theories of
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a public employer could be liable under the Equal Protection Clause only for
intentional employment discrimination. The Court has never satisfactorily explained
the reason for not making the Title VII standard which is being applied to tens of
thousands of private sector employers, equally applicable to employers sued under
the Equal Protection Clause. In the field of employment discrimination, the intent
doctrine can be made compatible with the neutrality doctrine only if the current equal
protection standard is raised to the level of the well-established Title VII standard.
The doctrine of invidious intent is in uneasy tension with the doctrine of
neutrality in the Equal Protection Clause. The obvious way to ease the tension is to
discard the intent doctrine and embrace the neutrality doctrine as the sole unifying
principle of the Equal Protection Clause, but the Court has not taken that bold step.
Because the intent doctrine has entrenched itself in several areas of the current equal
protection jurisprudence, the only feasible alternative available to the Court, at least
for the time being, is to craft explicit and durable alterations to the intent doctrine to
make it compatible with the neutrality doctrine. The Court should move forward in
that direction, realizing that the invidious intent doctrine is not only difficult to
apply, but also fundamentally unsuitable to serve the majestic purposes of the Equal
Protection Clause.
liability, see Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982) and International Brotherhood
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
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